

*to our carbon
copy of USIA
roll*



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

September 23, 1960

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for forwarding me the USIA
report on "Free World Views of the US-USSR
Power Balance". I read it with much interest.

Sincerely,

John N. Irwin II
John N. Irwin II

Mr. R. W. Komer

United States Information Agency


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DCI
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Bissell
Kirkpatrick

Copies forwarded on 14 Sep 60 to:

Gordon Gray
Karl Harr
Jack Irwin

Copies forwarded on 14 Sep 60 to:

Gerard Smith

Copies forwarded on 13 Oct 60 to:

AD/NE & Mr. Cooper
Jim Critchfield

6 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Oren Stephens
Director, Office of Research and Analysis
U. S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: USIA Study on Free World Views of the
US-USSR Power Balance

1. I have read with great interest the draft report we asked you to do on this key subject. It is a highly effective and competent piece of work which, incidentally, is quite in accord with our own impressions as garnered not only from other intelligence sources but from earlier USIA country opinion surveys.

2. Hence, please accept our thanks for a job well done. I hope to see that it gets brought to the attention of the top level of this Agency and the intelligence community as a whole.



STAT

ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Distribution:

Orig. and 1--Addressee

2--O/DD/I

O/DD/I:RWKomer:mhs(2 September 1960)



~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Amory, Jr.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Free World Views of the US-USSR Power Balance

Since the report you requested on the above subject has been some time in the making and still has to be duplicated, I am attaching a carbon copy as evidence that you will get the finished report shortly. If multiple copies of the report are needed, we will be glad to supply the number you wish.

*we now
have 20
copies.
RWK*

Oren Stephens


Oren Stephens
Director
Office of Research and Analysis

Attachment
As stated.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

1 September 1960



MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

The attached USIA survey, which we requested some time ago, is first-class though gloomy reading. USIA has done a real service, which we ought to exploit as another means of awakening people to the realities of the 1960s.

a. Attached is a draft note to Oren Stephens thanking him for a good job ~~and requesting 20 copies.~~

b. In light of DCI's and Bissell's earlier interest, it might be worthwhile to send copies personally to DCI, DDCI, DDP, etc., with a little cover note from yourself. Will draft one if you like. *yes*

c. We should also give it wide dissemination within the Agency.

d. USIA will distribute this as a regular intelligence report, but you may wish to consider bringing it personally to the attention of higher level audiences. One suggestion would be to send it to USIB members. More important, perhaps, you might wish to send it to such as Gordon Gray, Karl Harr, Jack Irwin, Gerry Smith, et al, noting that it was done at our request. Otherwise they may never see it.

e. You recall that when I did my own little study some months ago (based on a culling of intelligence items by OCI and DDP), I recommended not only asking for the USIA study but also considering how we might integrate it and these other materials into a paper with broader impact, perhaps an SNIE. I still think that this subject is so important as to justify our making a systematic effort of some sort.

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R. W. KOMER~~SECRET~~

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Shift from US
20 May '60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Research and Analysis,
USIA

SUBJECT: Indications of Shifting Free World View
of Power Balance Between US and USSR

1. CIA is taking a close look at the mounting indications of a general shift in free world attitudes from a feeling that the US is incomparably the world's strongest power to a growing feeling that the USSR is indeed outstripping the US. We are reviewing our own and State Department field reports for indications of the above.

2. Some of the most valuable indications of the above trend are contained in the excellent public opinion survey reports produced by USIA. I have such studies in mind as your "Brief Summary of Some Survey Indications Bearing Upon US vs Soviet Scientific Rivalry", December 1959. The Gallup Poll cited in the New York Herald Tribune of 12 February 1960 on who would be ahead in science ten years from now, is another case in point. Most directly relevant perhaps are your excellent WS-62 and WS-63 of April 1960 on the general standing of the US and USSR as seen through European eyes.

3. I would like to request an informal report pulling together the various opinion survey and other indications available to USIA which bear on this shift in free world attitudes toward the US-USSR power balance with particular reference to whether any trend lines can be discerned. It is of course a factor that the intelligence community as a whole should take increasingly into account.

/s/

ROBERT ANCHUT, JR.
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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UNITED STATES
INFORMATION
AGENCY

Office of Research and Analysis

FREE WORLD VIEWS OF THE US-USSR POWER BALANCE

R-54-60

August 29, 1960

This report is not a statement of USIA policy.

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FOREWORD

This report, originally requested as an informal contribution to a government study, is being issued in this series as of general interest to the Agency.

It comprises a summary of general trends and highlights; a series of regional discussions of the comparative power images held; and summary tabulations of data from available public opinion surveys that have a significant relation to aspects of the power confrontation. There is also appended a list of recent IRI reports bearing on the subject.

No uniformity of approach has been attempted in the regional sections of the report, in view of the diversity of factors that are locally active in shaping impressions of US and Soviet power, and regional disparities in the nature and availability of evidence regarding opinions and attitudes. What has been sought in these sections is to permit the issues to be seen within the context of regional history, preoccupations, and concerns.

It should be borne in mind that both the nature of the questions at issue, and the nature and fragmentariness of the evidence available, mean that overall analysis of foreign views on relative US-USSR power is necessarily generalized and tentative. As the report suggests, the nature of power itself, as it is measured by foreign opinion, is in the course of evolution, and the circumstances in which power would be applied are not seen as a constant by any audience.

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SECRETFREE WORLD VIEWS OF THE US-USSR POWER BALANCE*A. GENERAL TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS

1. The concept of national power in international relations is currently undergoing redefinition in the public mind. In this process, the elements that constitute power, the ways in which power is applied, and the context in which power is envisaged and assessed, are all being significantly revised and extended. In this continuing flux, no clear and controlling concept, and no final verdict on power-in-being or on relative power positions holds decisive sway, although a number of the factors that influence popular judgments can be discerned, as well as the current general direction of those judgments.

2. Current views of relative US-USSR power have changed sharply since the advent of the first Sputnik and the development of intercontinental missile capabilities. Prior to these events, prevalent opinion was that the US enjoyed a clear preponderance of power. The current consensus would appear to be that the USSR now enjoys a rough but effective equivalence in strength overall. Behind in some fields, ahead in others, the USSR is seen as capable of offering a credible competitive challenge to the US in the major arenas of international rivalry.

3. The trend is adverse to the US; despite some fluctuations, and area variations, impressions of Soviet power superiority or gains seem to be rising in public opinion rather than falling. Anticipations of what the trend in power will be -- popular estimates of which nation will emerge generally strongest in a peaceful competition over the next few decades -- in most available indicators favor the USSR.

4. In the critical areas of military strength and space achievements and a rate of economic growth capable of supporting them at a high level, popular opinion in most West European countries, presumably the best informed and closely linked by interest and history, believes the US to be inferior to the USSR, although more sophisticated opinion may perceive a rough balance. In these specific fields, too, the trend is adverse. Elsewhere, most opinion is divided on military strength, with the predominant belief apparent that a nuclear stalemate prevails. However, in almost all areas, expectations appear to be that the USSR will achieve military superiority, although there is probably no clear concept of what this superiority will consist of, or what its significance will be.

5. In most parts of the world, the USSR is believed to lead the US in space achievements. This impression, stemming from the first Sputnik and strengthened by its aftermath, appears to have sometimes a durability impervious to fact, sometimes a volatility suggesting that it could be readily modified by sensational developments. Given the present capabilities of both sides, it is probable that the most favorable verdict the US can hope to elicit on its space performance will be the expectation of a see-saw pattern.

6. Virtually without exception, world opinion is now convinced that the USSR has made tremendous economic progress over the past decade. So much, in fact, that the gap between it and the US, which is still acknowledged to have the world's most powerful economy, is rapidly being closed. Concurrent with the widely held view that the USSR's current rate of economic

* The reader should be cautioned that this assessment does not include the reactions to the Soviet Union's latest triumph -- the successful recovery of its "second cosmic space ship" with its dog passengers.

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growth is substantially higher than that of the US, is the general tendency -- even in highly industrialized Western Europe -- to suspect that within the foreseeable future the USSR might even surpass the US in overall economic strength.

7. Popular acceptance of the idea that a "nuclear stalemate" obtains appears to be increasing; it may be the most widely held single view on relative US-USSR power. It does not necessarily conceive US-USSR strength as equal; it is based rather on the view that no margin of superiority is likely to be decisive in a nuclear war, since the side that initiated major hostilities would incur unacceptable retaliatory damage in turn. This view is less a judgment on ratios of strength than a belief that strength is held in an equilibrium of deterrence, "the balance of terror." The concept of such a deadlock seems to have rational and emotional attractiveness to foreign audiences: (1) Such a military stalemate appears to lessen the danger that either side would deliberately resort to force and is thus wishfully welcomed; (2) A balance of this kind appears to hold for third powers the prospect that their own international influence could assume expanded, perhaps decisive, weight; (3) It permits readier maintenance or assumption of neutralist positions by eliminating the attraction of a possible victor -- it is easier to be neutral if no one is going to win.

8. A nuclear stalemate carries for many the implication that the US-USSR rivalry will be resolved in alternative arenas. If major modern armaments are seen as unemployable to enforce settlement of the US-USSR competition, greater weight and decisiveness are given to other aspects of strength -- on the one hand, the political, economic, psychological, and ideological facets of a peaceful international competition; on the other, the ability successfully to fight a geographically limited war, a war with conventional weapons, or to intervene forcibly (directly or indirectly) in a local situation.

9. There appears to be a preponderance of belief that the USSR rather than the US would win a conventional war; there appears uncertainty whether wars could be confined to local areas or conventional weapons. In Western Europe, opinion seems convinced that any war between the major powers would be a nuclear war, and could not be localized; in areas where the interests of the greater powers do not appear so critically or manifestly engaged, the possibility of local and limited wars seems to have wider acceptance.

10. The sources of the public impression that the USSR has closed or is closing the power gap appear to be primarily:

a. Widespread belief that the Soviets lead in space achievements, and that these can be equated directly with military capability, and to a lesser extent with overall scientific and technical development and with the efficacy of the Soviet system.

b. The greatly expanded international presence of the USSR, which has appeared in recent years to be exerting influence and leverage in areas which had hitherto been denied it or where it had hitherto been inactive.

c. The confident tone and aggressive posture of the USSR, which has appeared to be speaking and acting from assumed strength. This assumption has apparently been lent credibility less by Soviet propaganda efforts than by concrete Soviet actions or successes, and by the apparent corroboration given Soviet claims by Western reaction. US expressions of public and official concern regarding the challenge of Soviet power appear

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to have been a significant element in validating the Soviet posture.

d. Doubts that the US has succeeded in effectively organizing and focussing the resources of the Western alliance, or that the US has shown itself fully effective in bring its own power to bear on its objectives.

e. Soviet foreign economic programs, that despite their comparatively restricted size have had high impact and visibility, through selective deployment and timing for maximum effect; these have helped to create the image of a productive and accelerating Soviet economy, especially in underdeveloped areas.

f. An impression of Soviet ruthlessness and fixity of purpose, combined with the impression that the Soviet people have greater faith in their principles, and are willing to work harder, than the people of the US. This view has not served to raise USSR in general esteem over the US, nor can it be equated with admiration for Communist institutions or doctrine, but presumably contributes to raising popular estimates of overall Soviet capabilities.

g. In Asia particularly, the belief that Communist China, with its massive population, has shown tremendous economic growth and dynamism makes it appear a substantial increment to Communist bloc strength -- a belief qualified, probably, by the sense that this strength is currently more potential than actual, and by some uncertainty about the ultimate correspondence of Communist Chinese and Soviet interests. In much of the Far East (notably excluding Japan) the impact of Soviet power is still relatively slight; Communist China is the basic power against which the US is measured in Southeast Asia, and Soviet power is sometimes also viewed as a force to be measured against that of Communist China.

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B. REGIONAL ANALYSESWESTERN EUROPEIntroduction

The question "How do Western Europeans currently rank the United States and the Soviet Union on the international balance of power scale in view of their worldwide rivalry?" is not easily answered for two major reasons -- both of which are highly subjective in character.

The first difficulty is inherent in the initial and personal decision regarding the relative weight to be assigned to each of the three major sectors of opinion; to political opinion as revealed in official government policy, parliamentary debates and public political speeches; newspaper opinion as reflected in editorials and feature commentaries; and man-in-the-street opinion as indicated by public opinion surveys. However, given the kind of democratic political society that prevails throughout most of Western Europe, this appraisal arbitrarily assumes that political opinion is the most important, followed fairly closely by press opinion and at some considerable distance by man-in-the-street opinion.

The second major difficulty stems from the lack of any commonly agreed on current yardsticks for measuring the relative power-standing vis-a-vis each other of such super-states as the United States and the Soviet Union. Although there is a fairly firm consensus as to what constitutes international power in the abstract -- military strength, economic might, scientific-technological skill and moral stature -- there is no corresponding agreement as to the relative importance of these various power-components within the context of the current US-USSR worldwide rivalry. For basic to any meaningful and realistic ordering is the subjective determination as to whether this rivalry will remain peaceful -- i.e., confined to the struggle for the minds and stomachs of mankind -- or whether it will eventually erupt into nuclear war. In either event, this appraisal again arbitrarily assumes that Western European opinion regards military strength -- "Who can beat whom?" -- and the will to use it as the acid tests of power in the current scientific nuclear-missile age, followed fairly closely by economic might and at some considerable distance by moral stature.

The Pre-Sputnik Image: Unchallenged US Dominance

From the vantage point of the present, it seems clear that "Sputnik I" and the cumulative American reaction to its manifold implications represent a major watershed in the Western European evaluation of the relative power standing of the United States and the Soviet Union. For, prior to the advent of the space or missile age in October 1957, few Western Europeans seem to have entertained any real doubts about American military, scientific, economic and moral superiority vis-a-vis the USSR and the American intention of using this superiority for the general good of mankind -- at least for mankind in the free world.

The fact that the United States could expose the Soviet Union to nuclear destruction while the latter could not effectively retaliate in kind -- the basis of the Dulles "massive retaliation" doctrine -- was universally regarded as concrete evidence of American military superiority. A superiority, moreover, which most Western Europeans believed was implicitly acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself. For, following the formation in 1949 of the North Atlantic defense system based on US nuclear might, there were no further direct Soviet challenges to the territorial status quo of Western Europe.

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The fact that the United States had the highest standard of living of any nation in the world was viewed as indisputable proof of American economic superiority. A superiority, moreover, which was clearly demonstrated by the ease with which the United States carried the tremendous burden of the postwar economic reconstruction of Western Europe -- the Marshall Plan -- and furnished increasing amounts of economic and technical assistance to other needy regions.

The fact that on virtually all levels of American society there was mass ownership of products of American scientific-technological ingenuity -- cars, radios, television sets, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, etc. -- was generally regarded as incontrovertible proof of the validity of the traditional picture of American scientific-technological pre-eminence. A superiority, moreover, which had been clearly demonstrated in the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and in the means of delivering them to their intended targets.

The fact that the United States was an open and democratic society -- one which was clearly dedicated in principle to the Western European liberal ideal of individual freedom, liberty and equality of opportunity -- was generally considered to be strong evidence of the moral superiority of American society vis-a-vis its dictatorial and regimented Soviet counterpart. A superiority, moreover, which was clearly manifested in American goodwill and benevolence towards most nations in the difficult postwar era and in its assumption of the unsolicited role of defender of the free world against the march of international communism.

The Post-Sputnik Image: US Dominance Seriously Questioned

Under the cumulative impact of Soviet spectacular "firsts" in rocket developments and the continuing chorus of sharp American self-criticism most Western Europeans have been shocked into a drastic -- and perhaps excessive -- revision of their pre-sputnik image of general Soviet inferiority to the United States. Accompanying this re-evaluation of the USSR as a dynamic and powerful military-economic-and-scientific complex has been a concomitant re-examination of the continuing validity of the pre-sputnik image of invincible American power and unquestioned world dominance.

Currently, most Western Europeans are convinced that the balance of military power no longer favors the United States as it formerly did. For, in their opinion, the Soviet leapfrog development of a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile has cancelled out the pre-sputnik American advantage of being able to rain nuclear destruction upon the Soviet Union while being virtually immune to a similar Soviet attack.

While sophisticated political and press opinion tends to regard the current military situation as one of nuclear stalemate in which neither of the two super-powers has any material advantage over the other, the more impressionistic popular opinion has seemingly concluded from Soviet boasts of superiority and American admissions of a temporary "missile gap" that the United States is not only currently militarily inferior to the USSR but will continue to be so for the next decade or two as well. Nevertheless, popular opinion is in complete accord with sophisticated opinion in holding that a major war between the US and the USSR is most unlikely in the present circumstances because, regardless of their relative military strengths, each still has the capability of inflicting terrible destruction upon the other. In short, regardless of differences of opinion about the relative military strengths of the world's two super-states, there is universal acceptance of the Churchillian thesis that "mutuality of terror" is a major deterrent to war in the nuclear age.

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Although convinced that the Soviet Union's recent success in redressing the military balance vis-a-vis the United States has paradoxically reduced the danger that either protagonist would deliberately resort to war as a means of resolving their differences, Western European opinion -- at least on the more sophisticated political and press levels -- is currently disturbed by two possible (albeit contradictory) implications of the post-sputnik military situation. First, the possibility of war by miscalculation -- that is, the fear that war might inadvertently result from a Soviet miscalculation as to how far it can exploit the current nuclear stalemate for the attainment of limited objectives, such as the takeover of West Berlin, for instance. And second, the possibility that "Western Europe could no longer reckon unconditionally upon the protection of America's atomic shield in the event of limited conflicts" -- that is, the fear that the United States might consider the possible nuclear destruction of an American city (such as New York or Chicago or Los Angeles) as too high a price to pay for resolutely opposing a limited Soviet aggression, such as the takeover of West Berlin or Helsinki, for example.

While Western European opinion still subscribes to the view that the United States is indubitably the world's economic leader and leagues ahead of the Soviet Union, its closest rival, of late increasing doubts -- particularly on the more sophisticated political and press levels -- have developed about the continuing supremacy of the American economy. Contributing to these growing reservations have been four major developments.

First, the general agreement that the Soviet Union's boasts of tremendous economic strides in the postwar era have a firm foundation in fact, as evidenced by such objective standards as the visible improvement in its level of living, its deep and continuing penetration of the aluminum, asbestos and oil export markets (to mention just a few) and its increasing foreign aid programs such as the ambitious Aswan Dam project on the Nile. Second, the widespread currency and authenticity that American reports, both official and private, have given to the USSR's claim that its economy is growing at an appreciably faster rate than that of the United States and that the gap between the two is being rapidly closed -- a claim which Western Europeans find easy to accept (even without American confirmation) in view of their own superior rate of economic growth over the past decade. Third, the visible faltering of the American economy on at least four major occasions in the past fifteen years, most particularly the 1957-58 recession and the current economic difficulties. And fourth, the apparent concern of the United States -- as indicated by its current exports drive and sponsorship of the still-to-be-born Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development -- that it can no longer singlehandedly carry the increasing burden of economic assistance to the developing nations of the world in direct competition with the USSR.

The pre-sputnik Western European image of the United States as the leading scientific-technological nation in the world has likewise been sharply eroded of late under the cumulative impact of the Soviet Union's spectacular successes with outerspace satellites -- largely because of the widespread layman's tendency to equate them with a high degree of scientific-technological attainment in general. Although the almost universal acceptance of Soviet superiority in rocketry has resulted in an across-the-board upgrading of Soviet science and technology, Western European opinion is still inclined to believe that the United States leads the USSR in the application of science for the general welfare of mankind. In addition, the more sophisticated opinion holds that American outerspace research, while less spectacular than its Soviet counterpart, is contributing more to man's basic scientific knowledge and eventual control of outerspace.

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While the moral stature of the United States as a nation dedicated to freedom and liberty remains as high as ever, a number of developments have combined of late to induce in Western European opinion -- particularly on the sophisticated political and press levels -- increasing doubts about the continuing American ability to provide the kind of imaginative and responsive leadership required by changing world conditions, such as the shift in Soviet strategy from the crude "cold war" philosophy of Stalin to the more subtle challenge posed by Khrushchev's "peaceful but competitive coexistence" philosophy.

A highly selective listing of the major events leading to this Western European questioning of American leadership during the past two-and-a-half years would of necessity include the following: the alleged tardy American recognition of the military and psychological challenge posed by the Soviet Union's spectacular series of "firsts" in outerspace developments; the alleged hiatuses in the conduct of American foreign policy occasioned by internal bickering, the illness of high US officials and elections; the alleged amateurish bungling which led to the Soviet torpedoing of the much-heralded Paris summit conference and the Geneva disarmament talks; the alleged failure to prevent the division of Western Europe into two potentially rival economic groupings; and the alleged inability of the Eisenhower administration to exercise effective and unified control over the complex governmental machinery concerned with foreign affairs.

Conclusions

Three major conclusions are suggested by the preceding analysis of current Western European opinion of the relative power standing of the United States and the Soviet Union. First, that the past few years have witnessed a sharp deterioration in the pre-sputnik Western European image of American military, economic, scientific and moral superiority vis-a-vis the USSR. Second, that during this same period Western European opinion has drastically revised its pre-sputnik view of the USSR as a generally backward nation to the current image of a modern dynamic and powerful military-economic-and-scientific complex -- one, moreover, which has already taken giant strides towards redressing the balance with the United States. And third, that Western European opinion is inclined to the "safe" view that the United States and the USSR will become progressively more equal in overall strength over the course of time, with neither having any appreciable military or economic or scientific advantage over the other.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Arab States

Introduction

Given the absence of survey data for the Arab countries, any assessment of Arab opinion must be derived wholly from the radio and press and from private expressions of opinion, including those of officials -- the latter often more rational and moderate than that publicly expressed. Recognition must be given to the Arabs' volatile nature and subjective outlook through which events are measured in extreme terms according to the interests of the Arab "nation" and reactions shaped by recent history: the continuing existence of Israel, the intense bias against "Western imperialism," and the commitment of Soviet bloc political, military, and economic support to the Arab world.

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Leadership

Arab opinion in recent months has tended to view the United States as a nation increasingly isolated and declining in prestige primarily because of "mistaken" policies and conflicting pressures within American society. There has been some contrast, however, between private and publicly expressed opinion with the latter denouncing US policies in extreme terms -- under government direction in the case of the UAR (because of dependence upon Soviet economic and military aid) and in other areas impelled by a desire to humiliate the US because of the Israeli issue. While private Arab opinion largely blamed the Soviet Union for the collapse of the Summit meeting, US judgment on the handling of the U-2 flight was seriously questioned. (The revelation of such flights occurring over a four-year period had the paradoxical effect of enhancing American military capability in Arab eyes, however.) Because of Israel, Arabs have tended to view American policy-making as "confused" and subordinated to "Zionism, imperialism, and reactionary influences" -- Western democracy in this respect tends to be regarded as decadent. The events in Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Cuba have been interpreted both as a defeat for America in supporting "unpopular" regimes (not necessarily dictatorships) and as an overwhelming vindication of Arab beliefs concerning military pacts and bases. Exclusive of the Communist press, there has been little effort in this context to vindicate Soviet policy, but Arab private opinion credits the USSR with having emerged in a stronger position. Arabs, however, have derided US statements concerning Communists in Cuba and Japan as another reflection of the US "failure" to recognize the force of nationalism. Some press accounts noted that the Japanese were not anti-American but opposed to military bases as "proved" by the favorable reception given Eisenhower in India.

There are indications that some Arab opinion at least tends to credit Soviet military power -- as measured by the effect of its retaliatory threats -- with having induced the violent Japanese reaction and more recently, with having "frustrated" US designs on the Congo. It is likely that, aside from aspects of policy and leadership, most Arabs tend to equate the US and the USSR in terms of overall power admitting an American edge in economic strength. This rough equation gives rise to the resentful fear that a detente -- affecting the Near East and in which Arabs will not be consulted -- may at some time take place. In this narrow context, Arabs tended to look privately upon the Summit collapse with favor. Most Arabs now hope that neutral forces will play a larger role for the purpose of protecting such third party interests and taking advantage of American "defeats."

Military

Arabs tend to regard the US and the USSR as about even in available military strength but most would probably credit America with greater military capability given her superior economic resources. They would regard the West today as the probable winner of a hot war and would look with alarm at the prospect of being aligned on the Soviet side in such a conflict at the present time. Most informed Arabs were privately pleased with the knowledge that the U-2 flights had taken place for four years and regarded the U-2 as a first-class technical achievement while expressing some skepticism about Soviet military defenses. They also expressed admiration for the flights as a reflection of American "toughness." Arabs are fully aware of the nuclear capability of both powers and tend to feel that a total conflict (inevitably involving the Middle East) is more likely than a limited war. (The Summit collapse apparently gave rise to genuine fears in this regard.) Informed Arabs are also aware of the growing strength of the Soviet economy and its military strength as measured by the increasing Soviet threats to Western military installations in the Middle and Far

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East -- threats to which Arabs have given at least some credence in the cases of Suez, Japan, and the Congo.

Alliance System

There has been no change in the deep-seated Arab opposition to military alliances and foreign bases. Recent events in Japan and the Congo for example, have intensified and, in Arab eyes, vindicated such opposition with the result that Arabs would like to believe that the Western base system is collapsing. They have attributed the weakening of alliances first to local opposition and secondarily to the U-2 affair and increasing Soviet pressure against the host countries. There appears to be no firm evidence that they equate this belief with a net decline in American military power. They contend privately and publicly, however, that US prestige and influence have declined and that the combined power of neutral nations will fill the vacuum.

Scientific

Arabs probably rate the US ahead of the USSR in overall scientific and technological achievement thus retaining the conventional view of American pre-eminence in these fields and bearing in mind the American lead in nuclear developments and application, and the widely recognized superior economic power of the United States. Soviet space achievements nevertheless have had a spectacular and generally favorable impact but the initial Arab impression of a Soviet lead in this narrower field may have been modified so as to view both powers as about even. It is probable that many Arabs tend to link space accomplishments with military capability and make little differentiation between scientific, military, or (propaganda) space ventures.

Economic

Most informed Arabs are aware of American economic superiority relative to the USSR and have a marked admiration for the US standard of living, recognizing Soviet drawbacks in the latter respect. However, the massive economic aid given by the Bloc to the UAR and Iraq during a period of extreme anti-Western feeling had the effect of portraying Moscow as "the greatest friend of the Arabs." This local outlook has since been modified by subsequent Arab reservations concerning Communist inroads in Iraq. Arab opinion tends to credit the USSR (and to some extent Communist China) with notable achievements in social welfare and industrialization and regards their ruthless fixity of purpose as worthy of application in the Arab world, although with avoidance of the human cost involved. A late 1957 survey of Arab student opinion at the American University of Beirut indicated that nearly half believed the Soviet Union would surpass America in economic strength in the next 25 years.

While Arabs would be inclined generally to accept "unconditional" aid from both sides and have done so (Yemen, Iraq, UAR), they remain predisposed to look first to the West. There is some unmeasured Arab opinion holding that Soviet aid projects which emphasize industrialization are more pertinent for their needs than American programs which Arabs feel are overly concerned with agriculture.

Greece, Turkey and Iran

Introduction

The proportion of the number of persons to the country's total population observed thinking aloud on the topics included in this report

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tends to decrease as one looks first at Greece, next at Iran, and finally at Turkey. Yet, all three countries share in common experiences which predispose them to view such matters either as favorable to the United States, or, in times of temporary setback to the US, with considerable equanimity. Thus, they have in common the memory of US strength and leadership exhibited in World War II, the successful employment of US pressure against Communist/Soviet encroachment on their territory during the late 1940's, and US military and economic aid given to their countries since World War II. Most recently, they have witnessed US defiance of Soviet threats against the West. Moreover, membership of each of these countries in a Western defensive alliance, whether it be NATO or CENTO, does afford at least to the government leaders and military participants in NATO or CENTO exercises a better realization of the actual strength of the United States than if their countries were not within these alliances.

The Eisenhower Doctrine and the defense treaty with each country growing out of that declaration have, it appears, given these governments a sense of protection, and has thereby served to decrease -- but not entirely eliminate -- their critical review of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet bloc. This is not to say, however, that each government is above using, on occasion, such observations as a pretext to wheedle more aid from the United States. Nor does it mean that opposition elements, particularly in Iran, like such a guarantee when it appears to keep the governing group in power.

In Iran the majority of the public probably would favor a modification of Iran's policy in line with the traditional stance of playing one great power off against another. At present, most Iranians who advocate this change in policy probably feel that the "cold war" will continue indefinitely, with neither bloc gaining much preponderance over the other. Among those Iranians who fear that a "hot war" might come any time, there probably is a desire for Iran to break away from the alliance in order to seek the comparative security of neutralism.

American officials returning from Turkey report that even the Turks who talk about East-West relations seldom go much further in their thinking than to assume that if the United States is against the "Russians" (Turkey's traditional enemy), then surely the Russians can be stopped -- for one Turk is always worth two Russians. The Greeks tend to be the most vocal of the three nationalities on these power subjects and there are probably more shades of opinion concerning them in Greece than in either Turkey or Iran.

Currently the press in Greece affords a fairly reliable index of what the public is thinking on these issues. In Turkey this is also true, despite the fact that the press is now saying very little on such matters, due to public preoccupation with internal developments under the new regime. In Iran, on the other hand, the press usually reflects only official thinking (or direction) on these issues. If that opinion sometimes coincides with the public's opinion, it is usually coincidental.

Leadership

In all three countries the United States is viewed as a well-intentioned but, on occasion, inept leader of the Free World. The Turks are constantly worried that the US will be tricked by the USSR into a false sense of security. The Iranians feel that the US is leading Iran along a dangerous path of all-out opposition to the Soviet Union, which can at any time lead to a "hot war" and place Iran directly on the firing line. The Shah is concerned that the US will concentrate so much on a nuclear war that it will overlook the possibility of a conventional and regionally localized

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war in which Iran will have to cope with encroachments from bordering areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The majority of Iranians (that is a majority of those who think about such matters) believe that the US exhibits naivete in pouring so much aid into Iran without carefully checking on how that aid is being spent. In Greece the United States was criticized by a number of newspapers for its "clumsy" handling of the U-2 incident, but although these same papers expressed a desire to see the return of "old and experienced" French and Britain influence in Western councils, they probably have remained convinced that both France and Britain have lost their one-time influence in world affairs. Many Greeks, according to Embassy Athens, felt that through the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit conference, the United States had allowed the Soviets to regain the propaganda offensive against the West.

Military

The Turks are the most inarticulate about US military strength. Nonetheless, army officers and civilian leaders have expressed concern that the Soviet bloc might overtake the US in military strength within the next decade or so unless the US increases its own strength and that of its allies. Each American success in the missile field, therefore, probably enhances Turkish confidence in US military strength. In Greece, there apparently has been some doubt felt by the public that the US is keeping up with the USSR in the missile race. But the recent success in the firing of the Polaris missile from submarines has elicited favorable press reaction concerning the redress of balance of Western power versus the Soviet Union. In Iran, the successful launchings by the United States of satellites and military missiles during the last few years have, it seems, wiped out any inclinations by Iranians to ascribe undue military significance to Soviet achievements along these lines. Iran's two leading newspapers, Ettela'at and Kayhan, were particularly impressed by the failure of the Soviet Union to follow up its threat to bomb air bases after the RB-47 incident. But what does seem to bother some Iranians (and especially the Shah) is the idea that the East and the West have reached a nuclear stalemate and, therefore, have made a conventional war more likely, if and when a war should break out. It is in the realm of conventional warfare that they fear the US is allowing itself and its allies to fall behind.

Alliance System

The vast majority of Greeks and Turks staunchly support their governments' membership in NATO (Greece and Turkey) and CENTO (Turkey). A majority of the Iranian public, however, does not enthusiastically support their country's membership in CENTO. These Iranians would prefer their country to return to a neutral stance so that 1) it might play one great power off against the other, 2) it might avoid provocation of the Soviet Union, and 3) the Shah's unpopular regime might lose the strong American support which they believe it now enjoys. In both Greece and Iran the press indicated, at the time of the cancellation of the President's trip to Japan, that it appeared that the US alliance system in the Far East was beginning to crumble due, it said, to a combination of Communist agitation and American support of unpopular regimes. Iranians, in particular, are still greatly impressed by the 1958 coup in Iraq and that country's subsequent (1959) withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. In Greece and Turkey, the governments, supported by their publics, have remained unshaken by Soviet threats of retaliation against Western military installations. Such threats did, however, stir up a demand in the Greek press (representing both pro-government and opposition opinion) that the government assure the Greek people that Greece retained the right to exercise control over reconnaissance flights. In Iran, although the (government-controlled)

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press contended that Iran retained the right to permit such flights in the future, these sentiments probably did not reflect Iranian opinion.

Scientific

In all three countries the majority opinion probably holds that the United States is ahead in the fields of science and technology, except in the missile field, and will likely remain ahead, or at least even, with the Soviet Bloc during the next 25 years.

Economic

The elite in Turkey tend to feel that, although at present the US is ahead in economic development, the USSR is rapidly catching up and may within the next 25 years overtake the US. (Based on a survey in June 1958 of students of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Ankara. The results of this survey are believed to reflect general elite opinion, both civilian and military.) In Greece, on the other hand, according to a survey conducted in late 1958, public opinion felt that the US would emerge economically stronger than the USSR within the same time span; there is no reason to believe that this opinion has changed. In Iran, the Turkish attitude probably is shared by a majority of the Persian elite. While the Turks view this prospect of Soviet economic supremacy with considerable apprehension, the Iranians are probably less concerned.

There is considerable resistance among the elite in Iran and Turkey to acceptance of large-scale aid programs from the Soviet Bloc. In Greece, according to the survey mentioned above, more than half of the respondents were willing to accept aid from any country. Only a small minority expressed an unwillingness to accept aid from the Soviet Union.

South Asia

Introduction

Newspaper editorials, the main source of impressions of South Asian attitudes on the following subjects, are not an accurate reflection of public opinion. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the press is government controlled; in Nepal the papers are frequently the mouthpiece for various political groups; and in India and Ceylon, where the press has had a relatively free voice on international issues, it is more critical of the Soviet Union and Communist China than is the general population. Except for India there is no public opinion survey data available, and even there the latest data is about a year old and is limited to urban, educated Indians. Many of the following assertions should therefore be regarded as "probably" or "possibly" true, and should be considered descriptive of the attitudes of the better-informed rather than of the rural, illiterate mass of the population whose opinions on such subjects are largely uncrystallized.

Leadership

The image of American statesmanship and leadership has suffered a setback as a result of several recent events, primarily the U-2 incident, the abortive Summit conference, the Japanese riots and the Cuban situation. Goodwill toward the United States is largely unimpaired, but doubts concerning its skill and ability to formulate and implement a successful foreign policy vis-a-vis the Communists has increased. South Asians are still disposed to accept the good intentions of the US, but its prestige and position as the leader of the Free World has fallen somewhat.

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Soviet belligerency and threats of military action against the US and its allies caused considerable apprehension, particularly in Pakistan, but also tended to increase the Soviet power image vis-a-vis the US. Pakistanis were also aware of the fate of several leaders whose governments, closely allied with the US, were overthrown in the past year or so. Under the impact of these various developments, many Pakistanis expressed strong reservations on the extent to which Pakistan could rely on the US for protection. Feeling was fairly widespread among the politically aware that Pakistan was a mere pawn in the East-West conflict whose loss would be a matter of regret to the US but, nevertheless, an acceptable minor setback in the larger struggle. Latent neutralist sympathies which had been suppressed for some time came to the surface in fairly strong form. In other South Asian countries, such as India, where existing non-alignment policies were firmly supported by public opinion, recent events were considered pointed justification for this policy; a rather vocal minority in India who had been advocating some form of regional anti-Communist pact became, for the time being at least, fairly quiet.

Military

The US and the USSR are viewed as of about equal military strength at the present time, although the Afghans partly because of physical proximity may be more impressed with Soviet military strength. However, the slightly predominant view in South Asia, particularly in India, is that time is on the side of the Soviets and it will not be too many more years before the USSR will be stronger militarily. Despite South Asian respect for power, this prospect is not looked upon with equanimity by Indians and Pakistanis, where the growing image of a powerful USSR arouses some apprehension. A military power balance between the two blocs is generally favored because it is considered that this balance is an effective deterrent to war. In times of crisis, fears that a nuclear war may be triggered off by some individual miscalculation are more frequently expressed in India than are assumptions that an East-West conflict can be contained to conventional warfare. Controlled nuclear disarmament is considered the primary disarmament objective.

Alliance System

The predominant attitude toward the US alliance system continues to be one of rather strong disapproval except in Pakistan, which is the sole South Asian member of SEATO and CENTO. Despite a more frequent expression of neutralist attitudes in Pakistan recently, there has been little if any public questioning of the membership in these two organizations. Sentiment has been expressed, however, that the US ought to assume greater obligations in CENTO. On the other hand, alleged inefficiency and lack of coordination in Washington have raised some doubts that the US could be relied on to act decisively and with sufficient speed to help Pakistan if it were attacked.

Scientific

The USSR is considered about equal to the US in the general scientific field and perhaps slightly superior to the US in space science. Soviet space achievements are for the most part responsible for the rapid upward reevaluation of Soviet scientific capabilities in the last few years. New advances in space science capture far less attention than earlier ones, however, and it would probably require some very dramatic achievement by the US to balance the Soviet's lead in the public mind. At present the general opinion is that the USSR will have the edge over the US in the general field of science in a few years time.

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Economic

The US is considered somewhat ahead of the USSR at the present time, and far ahead of Communist China in economic strength. In ten or twenty years time, however, the general belief is that the USSR will be an economic equal of the US, if not slightly superior. There is, however, little if any interest in the strictly regimented economic system of the Communist bloc, despite an acknowledgement that economic goals can possibly be reached faster by such methods. A mixed economy is strongly favored.

The predominant attitude is that economic aid from both Communist and non-Communist countries is desirable providing no strings are attached. Pakistanis, however, resent the large amounts of US aid given "neutral" countries like India, and Afghans feel that the US is not as dynamic in extending aid as it should be. Both Afghans and Indians deplore U.S. military aid, particularly that given to Pakistan.

AFRICAIntroduction

Africans view the American and Soviet power structures in terms of their own apprehensions and desires. They are overwhelmingly concerned with independence, socio-economic development and the preservation of "positive neutralism." They have only a tangential interest in the Cold War, except as it directly impinges upon Africa. Knowledge and opinion about the Soviet Union are in the formative stage. Africans have a greater, if sometimes distorted, awareness of the US, including the negative as well as the positive aspects. Furthermore, they tend to associate the US with European colonial powers -- by race, culture, military alliance, and African policy.

There are very serious limitations to the data available for an assessment of the American power image in Africa. The very few available opinion surveys confirm that the US stands well above the Soviet Union in overall esteem but the surveys have not elicited African views on the various categories covered below. This assessment, therefore, relies primarily upon statements by government officials and other articulate leaders -- the statements are neither numerous nor detailed on the particular items involved -- upon newspaper editorials, very limited survey data, and impressionistic insights. The fact that Africans are just beginning to relate themselves to the rest of the world accounts for the absence of a perspective against which to interpret current African opinion.

Leadership

Their demand for strong government at home conditions Africans to respect forceful and wise leadership elsewhere in the world. During the past year particularly, many Africans have felt that Khrushchev has seized the initiative around the world and that American leadership has been increasingly on the defensive. Some sections of the African press have linked together the U-2, Summit collapse, Japan, Turkey, and Cuba as evidence of the decline of American prestige and leadership. Khrushchev's arrogance at Paris did much to redress the earlier inclination to criticize

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severely American "blunders" in the timing and subsequent handling of the U-2 incident. Except in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which were directly involved, there was little African reaction to the President's foreign tours, except that the cancellation of the visit to Japan was viewed as a set-back to American prestige. Conscious of their own inability to assume a decisive role in world politics, Africans argue that both the US and the USSR fail in their grave responsibilities toward all mankind. Africans continue to look to Washington for positive leadership (in French tropical Africa, however, DeGaulle is probably the most highly esteemed world statesman) and feel that the US must exercise more initiative if the West is to cope with Moscow's world-wide efforts to undermine the West's position. Africans await a more dynamic American role in Africa and interpret the absence of it as proof that American leadership, deferring unnecessarily to the colonial powers, has not yet grasped the meaning of the new structure of world politics.

Military

By and large, African opinion tends to believe that the US is ahead of the Soviet Union in total military power but that the margin is shrinking rapidly. Increasingly the USSR is held to be equal or slightly superior to the US in missile capability and a survey in Nigeria indicates that college students believe that the USSR will lead the US in overall military posture after two decades of coexistence. There has been relatively little African attention to the capacity of both sides to engage each other in limited warfare but Africans are very aware that either side can wage nuclear and missile warfare at the present time. Apprehensive over the possibility that all-out nuclear war could be provoked by accident or inflamed passions, Africans disapprove of what they believe to be sporadic reckless behavior on both sides -- for example the U-2 incident. The U-2 affair reinforced overwhelming opposition to foreign military bases on African soil, an opposition which now extends to space-tracking stations which Africans fear may have military implications involving them in the Cold War. Africans hold that both countries are endangering all mankind by exorbitant expenditures on armaments and that neither has worked hard enough towards arms reduction. Some Africans think that the US is overly cautious about a disarmament agreement with the Soviets; Khrushchev's UN disarmament speech in 1959 was well received in some quarters and the US was urged to approach it with utmost sincerity and a "proper respect" for the fears of mankind.

In their propaganda to Africa the Soviets have not boasted of their military capability as much as they have of their readiness to repel American or NATO "military aggression." They have, however, hammered at the theme of American military encirclement of the Orbit and particularly of American efforts to drag Africa into this "Western aggressive bloc." The impact of this propaganda is largely unknown. While it probably has served to enhance the Soviet military posture in African eyes, Africans have tended to oppose any Big Power military venture in Africa and particularly outside of the UN. Thus it is at least probable that Soviet propaganda has not served to impair African views of US military strength.

Alliance System

African opinion about American involvement in military alliances is concentrated almost entirely upon NATO. The reasons for the existence of the alliance are eclipsed in African eyes by the widely-held persuasion that US deference to its Western allies is the single most important cause of the failure of the US wholeheartedly to support African aspirations for independence and socio-economic development. Nowhere is this more apparent

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than in long-standing African resentment -- particularly in North Africa -- over alleged American indifference to independence for Algeria. On the same grounds there has been very minor criticism of the US for not taking a stronger stand against Belgian military intervention in the Congo in July 1960. The feeling persists that the US supports European desires to associate Africa with the NATO system. For example, Moroccans in 1958 vigorously opposed what they believed to be a move to place the US bases in Morocco under NATO command. One aspect of peripheral interest in recent events in Korea, Japan, and Turkey is the feeling that the US supports "political corpses" primarily in the interest of maintaining her military alliances. Africans recognize that Soviet propaganda coincides with their own desires to be free of military pacts with the West, but also tend to recognize that such propaganda is calculated in the first instance to serve Moscow's and not Africa's objectives.

Scientific

African opinion places the US ahead of the USSR in total scientific achievement but believes that the Soviet Union has made remarkable strides in a short space of time. Soviet space accomplishments have made the largest single impact and tend in African minds to be taken as representative of total Soviet scientific capacity. In late 1959, following spectacular Soviet space successes, many Africans believed that the USSR had temporarily outstripped the US in this field but at the same time confidently expected the US to redress the balance. They may now believe that the US has done so. What most impresses African thinking -- the same applies to Soviet economic strength -- is the speed with which the USSR became a major scientific power. This attitude is based in part on a lack of knowledge of the scientific tradition inherited by the Soviets and in part on what Africans resentfully call the West's calculated downgrading of Soviet scientific capacity in the past. The US is generally placed ahead of the USSR in the teaching of science, and African students who have been to the Soviet Union unfavorably contrast Soviet restrictions upon scientific inquiry with unencumbered scientific experimentation in the US. There is some feeling that the Soviet system is better geared than is the American for rapid growth of science and technology and this attitude, together with Soviet space accomplishments, probably accounts for the belief in some quarters that in future years the Soviets may surpass the American scientific effort.

Economic

African opinion places the US ahead of the Soviet Union in total economic power but believes that the Soviets are steadily decreasing the margin. As in the case of scientific development, the pace of Soviet economic growth has made a considerable impact upon an underdeveloped Africa searching for the best approach to its own economic hurdles. Africans feel that the US economic system has been uniquely rewarding for the US but that it is not applicable to Africa's very different situation. Predisposed to a large governmental role in the economic sphere, African opinion respects the results that Communist organizational techniques can provide in a relatively short time. The organizational techniques and the pace of development largely account for a growing African belief that the Soviet economic system -- properly adapted to local circumstances -- represents the "wave of the future." These assumptions give rise to the impression that the Soviet centralized economic effort is inherently more powerful than an American capitalist system which they tend to view in nineteenth century terms. At the same time Africans are critical of excessive regimentation in the Soviet Union. They picture the US as fantastically wealthy but feel that the US does not use its economic abundance as judiciously as it might. Some tend to be critical of American "consumer waste"

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and believe that the US can and should devote more resources to Africa's economic development. They believe that American capacity to assist Africa exceeds Soviet capacity, but that the scarcity of American economic aid results from excessive American deference to the colonial powers.

FAR EASTSummary and Conclusions

The general trend of informed opinion in Southeast Asia seems to agree on the following propositions.

1. The image of US power has deteriorated while that of the Soviet Union has appreciated. In general, the United States still is regarded as the leading industrial nation of the world and as the leader in scientific and technological fields. The margin of US leadership has been narrowed, however, and it is considered as lagging in the missile race.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union is regarded as the leader in the missile field. The dramatic quality of its seizure of this position has rubbed off on its general power image in other scientific and industrial categories, but not enough yet to place it ahead of the United States in these general fields.

In sum, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be at a stand-off. This in itself, however, represents a considerable reduction in the stature of US power from its pre-1957 position when Sputnik was first launched into space.

2. As the US power image has faded, however, the recognition of the need for US power in Southeast Asia has increased. This largely resulted from the impact of the threatening acts of communism during 1959 in Tibet, along the Sino-Indian border, in Laos, and in Indonesia in the dispute over the Overseas Chinese there.

3. The compelling presence of Communist China in the area -- with its expansionism, its massive population and its tremendous economic growth -- provides the basic power against which that of the United States is measured in Southeast Asia. The impact of Soviet power is still relatively slight and is sometimes viewed in the area as a force to be measured against that of Communist China rather than with it.

Japanese opinion too agrees that US power has diminished relative to that of the Soviet Union, but also without providing a clear-cut opinion as to which is ahead. Unlike Southeast Asia, however, the Soviet Union remains the chief threat to Japanese security and Communist China's power potential is still undervalued.

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The hopes, fears and doubts about American power in the region were reflected accurately in a recent series of remarks attributed to the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who made them during a recent informal discussion with a Western businessman. Rahman reflected an unwritten fear in the Far East that the United States will not use its power

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effectively to defend them when he observed that during World War II, "Asia was let go to the dogs." The common fear of Communist China was clearly present in Rahman's observation that China will dominate the Asia of the future. The Malayan leader went on to describe what he termed American "provocation" of Communist China over Taiwan and offshore islands as a cause for great concern in Southeast Asia. And finally, according to the report, Rahman declared that it was his belief that the Soviet Union would probably surpass the United States in productivity within 15 years, and that Communist China would probably not be far behind.

Southeast Asia

US-Soviet Power

The change in the power images of the United States and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia is due almost entirely to the Soviet launching of the Sputnik in October 1957. The continued disparity in the size of rockets and the weight of the payloads has solidified Southeast Asian opinion that the Soviet Union indeed retains its rocket supremacy over the United States. This image is conditioned somewhat by limited recognition that the United States has engaged in more frequent space "shoots" and that these have been more meaningful in scientific terms than have the Soviet weight-lifting performances. But the dramatic quality of the first Sputnik, coupled with the fact that the Soviet achievement appeared to come from nowhere -- since the prevailing view was that the Soviets had only a poor scientific capability -- has not yet been matched by the United States. And the popular image has tended to place perhaps undue emphasis on the missile capability as the portent of the future, perhaps even as a rough rule-of-thumb of future overall military power.

The Soviet space achievements have, as a result, created a favorable setting for more serious Southeast Asian consideration of other scientific, technical and industrial accomplishments of the Soviet Union. The countries of Southeast Asia for example are now more prone to consider USSR offers of technical aid and to adopt textbooks and educational techniques from Moscow. The Soviet Union, in fact, has been moved up on the scale of modernized nations to a place second only to that of the United States.

Despite this dramatic upgrading of the Soviet Union, the US lead in industrialization, in technological know-how and in scientific stature is still recognized. Leaders in Southeast Asia are prone to balance Soviet rocketry against the more conventional US power apparatus. For the present, the US appears to hold a thin margin of lead in terms of the total components of power. But it is a fragile thing at best, for reports reveal that the Soviet Union is whittling away at the keystone of the US power image, total economic power. Surveys conducted among students in the Philippines (1958) and in South Viet-Nam (1959) continue to show a majority believing that the United States will retain its economic lead after 25 years; but 30-40 percent in both cases view such a long-term competition as ending either in a draw or are undecided. In the Philippines, one out of ten interviewed foresaw the Soviet Union ahead by that time. These opinions, coming from nations predisposed in favor of the US, do not reflect overwhelming confidence in the outcome.

An editorial in the Times of Viet-Nam on March 5, 1960, summed up the prevailing current of opinion on the respective US-Soviet power images:

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American protection has become questionable. The Soviet Union now possesses the nuclear bomb. American protection is no longer absolute. An association with the United States may become risky.

Appreciation of the Need for US Power

While American power may have deteriorated in competition with that of the Soviet Union, the appreciation of US power and the recognized need for its protective presence in the area is more commonly acknowledged now than ever before. Events in 1959, including such developments as the repression in Tibet, the threatening Laos crisis, the explosive Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Indonesian recriminations over the status of Overseas Chinese, have combined to produce an aura of uneasiness in the minds of Southeast Asian leaders and elites. Many chose neutralism as a practical recognition of the inherent vulnerability of their nations under pressure from two powerful blocs. Lulled by the talk of peaceful co-existence under the five principles evolved by Nehru and Chou En-lai, Southeast Asia believed it had found a reliable course upon which it could be free to conduct the necessary business of consolidating independence. The onslaught of Communist aggressive acts during 1959 shattered this euphoria.

The reaction in Southeast Asia showed elements of both resentment and fear. The Southeast Asians were resentful that their hopes for peaceful conditions were so rudely shattered in what seemed to them a denial of pledges of peace made to them repeatedly by the Communists. But they were fearful over the implied threat and power that the renewed belligerence appeared to hold in store. Many leaders and military men in particular reacted with a new appreciation of and expression of interest in US power in the area.

For virtually the first time it was directly acknowledged that in the final analysis, it was American military power which would determine the freedom or demise of the vulnerable countries of Southeast Asia, faced with the potential of Communist aggression. Two of the nations in the area most firmly committed to a course of neutralism, Indonesia and Burma, expressed their sentiments on this question guardedly but unmistakably. On several occasions during 1959 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio indicated that he had a new appreciation for the presence of American forces in the Pacific and during a visit of American warships to Indonesia in November 1959, Subandrio privately stated that Indonesians consider the US Seventh Fleet a valuable protective screen. The army regime in Burma during 1959 too expressed similar sentiments. General Ne Win, then Premier of Burma, expressed an appreciation of SEATO and of American power in the area and a desire to have the US protective screen available.

Thailand and the Philippines, allies and friends of the United States, have turned increasingly to SEATO as a result of the Communist belligerence. Surveys in both countries, but particularly in Thailand in 1957, 1958 and 1959, showed an increasing awareness of SEATO and a better appreciation of its value to their country and area. During the crisis in Laos in the early fall of 1959, many papers in the area for the first time reported that SEATO would have to act should UN intervention prove to be ineffective.

Cambodia's tentative turning toward a closer tie with Communist China as a result of the pressure of events in 1959 highlights the impact of fear of Communist China by neighboring states.

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The appreciation of US power and of the need for it has, however, been only a relatively recent phenomenon, even among many of our allies in the area. It is in part dependent upon recognition of the real threat posed by Communist aggression and subversion. The naked Communist threat to the area was readily apparent in 1959, but this will not always be true. Thus, the favorable attitudes toward US power may tend to vary considerably with circumstances and may depend in part on our avoidance of actions which could be viewed as "colonialist." It should be borne in mind also that even with the bald nature of the Communist actions in 1959, almost no prominent leader made a public pronouncement of his privately expressed desire for US military protection, and none of the neutralist nations abandoned their efforts to get along with both camps.

American Power Challenged by Communist China

The Communist aggressiveness which has aroused the fear of the Southeast Asian nations has come from Communist China rather than from the Soviet Union. The frequent hesitation of the area's leadership to give public utterance to their desire for US protection has been in large part due to the conviction that Chinese power is next door, while US power, no matter how great, is relatively remote and even undependable. Russian power, though a factor, is almost never considered as a real threat to the area; in fact, it is occasionally treated as a factor to be balanced against that of Communist China.

Many in Southeast Asia appear to believe that the Chinese colossus in the north is now embarked on a tremendous build-up of economic and military power which will sooner or later be used to engulf Southeast Asia. More and more opinion appears to regard Communist China as the "wave of the future," not necessarily ideologically but in terms of tangible power. It is against this raw image that US power is being measured. Despite a desire to regard American power in defense of Southeast Asian independence as a firm and decisive force, hesitation and doubt are clearly evident. An editorial in the Times of Viet Nam of March 5, 1960, quoted earlier, observed:

To the allies of the United States, especially the smaller ones, the application of this doctrine [massive retaliation] means that their association with America increases the risk of their being destroyed. The type of war which will take place in the small countries will be the limited war. And precisely according to the 'massive retaliation' doctrine, the United States should not let itself be involved in this type of war. America's full power will be used only to defend America.

The implication presented in this editorial, and present in other opinion from the area, is that US power is currently designed to meet global military situations, not the limited, jungle-type warfare most likely to materialize in Southeast Asia. It is reported too that high Indonesian officials, including a close advisor of President Sukarno, expressed doubt that American assistance would be sufficiently timely or effective to defend Indonesia from a Chinese Communist attack. This direct question is not frequently discussed openly in the area, but one aspect of it was explored directly by the military President of our SEATO ally, Pakistan, in an interview with the New York Times on June 25, 1960.

General Ayub Khan, according to the Times, noted that Pakistanis were "beginning to doubt" that the US Government could react quickly enough to repel an enemy attack. The President of Pakistan said he did not doubt that the United States possessed the power to repel any attack, i.e., the

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image of US power was a strong one, but he commented that the governmental machinery to apply this power was "cumbersome, sluggish and a clumsy juggernaut." Ayub's comment bears on the central question raised in Southeast Asia, namely, the application of US power in a timely and effective manner to meet Southeast Asian needs.

It is ironic, but nonetheless central to the issue at question, that the nations of Southeast Asia, though often deploring the use of US power in such places as the Taiwan Straits in the fall of 1958 and in Lebanon and the Middle East earlier that summer, nevertheless were impressed by the effective disposition of American power in these situations which they could identify with those which could be operative in Southeast Asia. These demonstrations of our military effectiveness and national purpose, especially in the successful defense against the Chinese Communist operations directed at the off-shore islands, worked to our advantage and enhanced Southeast Asian confidence in our national power. The doubts and hesitations considered here, however, have not been dissipated, and they remain as a significant shadow on the image of American power.

Japan

In the past several years, the Japanese have unmistakably revised downward their estimation of US power relative to that of the Soviet Union but there is no clear evidence that the Japanese consider either nation as having a significant power advantage over the other.

Soviet space and rocketry achievements, economic progress and expanded aid to underdeveloped areas, together with rapidly advancing Japanese technological and scientific capabilities, have ended the post-war era of almost mystical awe of US achievements and inevitably produced a relative downgrading in the Japanese estimate of US pre-eminence and power. Likewise, the recent instability of Japanese popular sentiment toward relations with the US in part reflects lessened confidence in the ability of the US to withstand and counter Soviet pressures exerted around the Free World defense perimeter. This was obviously one of the factors some Japanese had in the back of their mind when speaking of the "changed atmosphere" in Japan after the U-2 affair and the Summit debacle. Yet, even earlier, the Japanese press was wont to speak of "the precarious military balance between East and West." And the Japanese have evidently begun to doubt the capability of American power to provide adequate protection to Japan in the event of conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Such was the psychological context in which during May and June so many Japanese apparently came to accept the claim of Bloc propaganda that the new US-Japan Security Treaty would increase the danger of war to Japan, even though they generally rejected the corollary claim that the treaty was aggressive in nature.

At the same time, it should be noted that the diminution in confidence in US power over the past several years has resulted in part from a faulty assessment by many Japanese of some of the realities of world power relationships, as well as from their tendency to project onto the international level their doubts about the ability of domestic democratic forces to meet the challenge from leftist forces and to withstand the encroachment of re-emerging authoritarian elements.

Those are some of the trends that have worked to reduce the reservoir of confidence in and respect for US power that had been built up through popular experience with, and information about US technological, military

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and economic capabilities since 1944. However, as to the net effect of these trends, the fact remains that neither the findings of public opinion surveys since Sputnik I nor the output of Japanese "opinion leaders" have produced a clear-cut statement as to which power the Japanese in general feel is the stronger.

Unlike opinion in Southeast Asia, the Japanese do not yet regard Chinese Communist power as a threat to their security. They have, however, begun to regard with greater seriousness the growth of Chinese economic power as a potential competitor in Southeast Asia.

LATIN AMERICA

The Evidence

It should be borne in mind that the materials available for assessment of the Latin American view of the balance of power between the US and the USSR are fragmentary and uneven in reliability. These sources are field reporting, newspapers and periodicals, books, pamphlets, radio commentaries, returning US government officials, direct contacts while traveling in the area, and a few public opinion surveys. Therefore, any inferences drawn must for the most part be broad rather than detailed, suggestive rather than definitive. Moreover, attitudes on many issues related to the formation of the Latin American power images of the US and the USSR are still unformulated and unstable. For example, the relative strength attributed by Latin American opinion to an open society versus a controlled society for military purposes cannot be accurately measured from material available, nor can the Latin American opinion of such intangibles as moral strength, sense of purpose, or the "best man" in the "may-the-best-man-win" contest.

The Psychological Setting

Before discussing Latin American attitudes toward the US-USSR balance of power, the point should be made that Latin Americans generally regard themselves as not immediately involved in the Cold War. A lack of appreciation of the true nature of international communism and of the threat that it represents makes it difficult to convince Latin Americans of the necessity for coordinated anti-Communist measures. Moreover, it must be observed that domestic problems take priority over everything else in Latin American preoccupations, and that international issues, including that of international communism, are more likely to attract substantial public attention only when plainly seen as closely related to domestic considerations. Thus, Latin America tends toward isolationism from rather than direct involvement in the Cold War, despite its moral and political commitment to the West and the recognition on the part of informed Latin Americans of their dependence on the US for the defense of the hemisphere.

The Current Power Image of the US and the USSR

The Latin American power image of both the US and the USSR had improved during the Second World War, but there was no question that in the minds of Latin Americans the US held first place, especially subsequent to the development of the atomic bomb.

With the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb new images began to develop which tended to polarize power between the US and the USSR. The

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superiority achieved by the US was maintained, but the "balance of terror" concept began to creep in, tending to cut into the US overall superiority. Polarized atomic power, in turn, promoted or deepened the feeling that weak countries might better disengage themselves from entanglements in which they could play no significant role. The true extent of "third positionism" in Latin America was (and is) a matter of conjecture, but the scant military support offered against communism during the Korean War demonstrated its influence.

Nevertheless, there was a feeling of Latin American security within "fortress America," lead by the still considerably superior power of the US. Then came the first Sputnik and its apparent implications for missile warfare capabilities. The effect of Soviet missile developments on Latin American opinion has not been to downgrade the US power image as much as to raise the Soviet. The new trend is rather a reversal of the post-World War II, pre-Sputnik, trend: both power images have improved in relation to themselves, but the Soviet image has improved much more.

The drama in this change for the better in certain aspects of the Latin American image of the Soviet Union stemmed from the fact that up to the time of Sputnik esteem for US accomplishments in the scientific and military fields had been so high among Latin Americans that they considered it virtually beyond belief that any power could challenge US supremacy in these areas. Opinion surveys conducted in several Latin American cities subsequent to Sputnik (November 1957 and May 1958) showed that many felt that the Soviet lead in space development would be only temporary. Moreover, these surveys revealed that leadership in space science was not necessarily equated with leadership in science generally, and that many respondents still had sufficient confidence in the power potential of the US to estimate that the US rather than the USSR would emerge stronger at the end of a twenty-five year period of peaceful competition.

Although survey data and other standards of measure are very scanty and difficult to appraise, it seems that the image of the Soviet Union as a power capable of outstanding achievements in the field of military science and technology is gaining hold. The USSR's ability to compete successfully with the US may thereby be becoming more believable. The results of a survey conducted in Buenos Aires in February 1960 might be regarded as a minor indicator of this trend. More respondents felt that the USSR had more military power than the US, and when asked which country would emerge stronger after twenty years of peaceful competition, more felt that the USSR rather than the US would emerge as the stronger power.

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C. SELECTED SURVEY FINDINGS1. U.S. Versus Soviet Faith and Dedicationa. The Current West European View

"Now a brief comparison on more personal qualities between the Soviet people and those of the U.S.: Who do you think has greater faith in their basic principles -- the Soviet people or the people of the U.S.?"

"And who do you believe is willing to work harder to have their country lead the other in national achievement?"

<u>Greater Faith:</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)
Soviet people	39%	51%	44%	35%
People of U.S.	28	18	14	28
Both same	15	12	19	18
No opinion	18	19	23	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-11	-33	-30	-7

Willing to work harder:

Soviet people	62%	65%	67%	52%
People of U.S.	14	10	5	11
Both same	11	8	11	17
No opinion	13	17	17	20
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-48	-55	-62	-41

2. U.S. Versus Soviet Military Standinga. The Current World View

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Survey</u>	<u>Date of Survey</u>	<u>Net Favorable to U.S.</u>
Viet-Nam	(College Students)	March, 1959	32
Greece	(General Population)	November, 1958	20
Okinawa	(General Population)	December, 1958	14
Italy	(General Population)	February, 1960	6
Uruguay	(General Population)	June, 1958	4
West Germany	(General Population)	May-June, 1960	3
Japan	(General Population)	December, 1958	-1
Turkey	(College Students)	June, 1958	-2
France	(General Population)	May, 1960	-15
Buenos Aires, Argentina	(General Population)	February, 1960	-21
Norway	(General Population)	June, 1960	-30
Great Britain	(General Population)	May, 1960	-43

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b. The West European Trend

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

No. of cases	<u>Great Britain</u>				<u>West Germany</u>				<u>Norway</u>	
	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	May '60	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	May- June '60	Nov. '57	June '60
	(800)	(611)	(613)	(1150)	(813)	(1739)	(599)	(1010)	(845)	(1020)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	4%	7%	)15%	)12%	16%	9%	)22%	)26%	)35%	)15%
U.S. a little ahead	15	19	)	)	22	15	)	)	)	)
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	31	22	)	)	17	16	)	)	)	)
Russia considerably ahead	19	19	)	)	6	7	)	)	)	)
Both equal (Vol.)	6	8	4	5	20	22	8	16	11	17
No opinion	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>23</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-31	-15	-44	-43	15	1	-25	3	4	-30

No. of cases	<u>France</u>				<u>Italy</u>				
	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	May '60	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
	(802)	(624)	(608)	(1000)	(807)	(635)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	6%	3%	)16%	)25%	17%	13%	16%	18%	)38%
U.S. a little ahead	11	16	)	)	17	25	17	18	)
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	13	21	)	)	13	14	11	10	)
Russia considerably ahead	12	8	)	)	9	9	7	8	)
Both equal (Vol.)	20	34	16	-	23	22	24	26	5
No opinion	<u>38</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>25</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-8	-10	-21	-15	12	15	15	18	6

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3. U.S. Versus Soviet Scientific Standinga. The Current World View

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in scientific development at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Survey</u>	<u>Date of Survey</u>	<u>Net Favorable to U.S.</u>
Philippines	(General Population)	March, 1959	48
Turkey	(College Students)	June, 1958	29
Greece	(General Population)	November, 1958	23
West Germany	(General Population)	February, 1960	18
Uruguay	(General Population)	June, 1958	12
Philippines	(College Students)	August, 1958	12
Italy	(General Population)	February, 1960	7
Viet-Nam	(College Students)	March, 1959	0
Norway	(General Population)	November, 1957	-12
Mexico	(General Population Mexico City)	March, 1958	-13
India	(General literate Population)	August, 1958	-16
Japan	(General Population)	December, 1958	-17
Buenos Aires, Argentina	(General Population)	February, 1960	-25
Okinawa	(General Population)	December, 1958	-26
Great Britain	(General Population)	April, 1960	-29
France	(General Population)	February, 1960	-40
Nigeria	(University Students)	February, 1959	-46

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b. The West European Trend

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in scientific development at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>				<u>West Germany</u>			<u>Norway</u>
	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	Apr. '60	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	Nov. '57
No. of cases	(800)	(587)	(608)	(1032)	(813)	(1195)	(623)	(845)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	7%	17%	}25%	}23%	14%	15%	}45%	12%
U.S. a little ahead	13	26			22	29		19
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	39	23	}58	}52	27	19	}27	34
Russia considerably ahead	19	7			5	4		9
Both equal (Vol.)	6	12	4	6	15	19	9	14
No opinion	<u>16</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>12</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-38	13	-33	-29	4	21	18	-12

	France			Italy					
	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(802)	(596)	(620)	(807)	(637)	(1076)	(691)	(650)	(579)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	4%	5%	)18%	12%	15%	10%	11%	11%	)40%
U.S. a little ahead	7	15		11	18	16	9	9	
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	29	21	)58	24	16	15	27	26	)33
Russia considerably ahead	20	13		13	14	13	18	16	
Both equal (Vol.)	16	33	9	21	21	26	17	21	4
No opinion	<u>24</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>23</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-38	-14	-40	-14	3	-2	-25	-22	7

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4. U.S. Versus Soviet Standing in Space Developmenta. The Current World View

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in space developments at the present time -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"

<u>Country and Date</u>	<u>Number of cases</u>	<u>U.S. Ahead</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. Ahead</u>	<u>Neither Ahead</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>
West Germany (May-June '60)	(1010)	11%	53%	12%	24%	-42
Great Britain (July '60)	(947)	10	58	4	28	-48
India - 4 Major Cities (August '58)	(724)	7	58	9	26	-51
Turkish Students (June '58)	(230)	7	67	20	6	-60
Norway (June '60)	(1020)	7	71	12	10	-64
Italy (February '60)	(1170)	11	75	3	11	-64
France (May '60)	(1000)	7	74	-	19	-67

b. The West European Trend

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in space developments at the present time -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>				<u>France</u>	
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Apr. '60</u>	<u>May '60</u>	<u>July '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>May '60</u>
No. of cases	(1221)	(1100)	(1150)	(947)	(1228)	(1000)
U.S. ahead	5%	11%	7%	10%	2%	7%
U.S.S.R. ahead	84	64	81	58	85	74
Neither ahead (Vol.)	2	5	4	4	3	-
No opinion	9	20	8	28	10	19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-79	-53	-74	-48	-83	-67

	<u>West Germany</u>		<u>Italy</u>	<u>Norway</u>
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>May-June '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>June '60</u>
No. of cases	(1222)	(1010)	(1170)	(1020)
U.S. ahead	7%	11%	11%	7%
U.S.S.R. ahead	77	53	75	71
Neither ahead (Vol.)	3	12	3	12
No opinion	13	24	11	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-70	-42	-64	-64

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c. The Current West European Desire

"Going back to space developments for a moment, what would be best, in your opinion -- for the U.S. to be ahead in space developments, the U.S.S.R. to be ahead, or neither to be ahead? How important do you think this is -- very important or not so important?"

No. of cases	<u>Great</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Britain</u>	<u>Germany</u>		
	Feb. '60 (608)	Feb. '60 (623)	Feb. '60 (620)	Feb. '60 (579)
Prefer U.S. ahead - very important	33%) 10) 43	27%) 11) 38	20%) 5) 25	28%) 8) 36
Prefer U.S. ahead - not so important				
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - very important	1) 2) 3	*) -) *	4) 2) 6	10) 3) 13
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - not so important				
Prefer neither ahead - very important	32) 12) 44	32) 15) 47	31) 25) 56	25) 6) 31
Prefer neither ahead - not so important				
No opinion	10 100%	15 100%	13 100%	20 100%

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5. U.S. Versus Soviet (Economic) Strength 25 Years Hencea. The Current World View

"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"

<u>Country and Date</u>	<u>Number of cases</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Both Equal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>
Philippines Students (Aug. '58)	(887)	50%	9%	24%	17%	41
Philippines (March '59)	(1609)	42	2	8	48	40
Netherlands (April '56)	(825)	44	13	16	27	31
Uruguay (April '59)	(1612)	36	15	8	41	21
Rio de Janeiro (May '58)	(200)	39	19	8	34	20
Vietnamese Students (Feb. & Mar. '59)	(462)	27	7	22	44	20
Greece (Nov. '58)	(1207)	30	12	8	50	18
Norway (Nov. '57)	(845)	38	23	18	21	15
Japan (Dec. '58)	(676)	23	17	6	54	6
Mexico City (May '58)	(200)	45	40	3	12	5
Okinawa (Dec. '58)	(577)	25	21	5	49	4
West Germany (Feb. '60)	(599)	29	29	19	23	0
Italy (Feb. '60)	(591)	22	24	32	22	-2
Buenos Aires (Feb. '60)	(560)	19	32	23	26	-13
India (Mid May-Aug. '58)	(724)	17	35	17	31	-18
Great Britain (Feb. '60)	(613)	25	44	10	21	-19
Turkish Students (June '58)	(230)	18	43	30	9	-25
France (Feb. '60)	(608)	7	35	25	33	-28
Arab Students (Dec. 1, '57 & Jan. 7, '58)	(274)	8	46	16	30	-38

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b. The West European Trend

"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"

No. of cases	Great Britain					West Germany						Norway
	Apr. '56	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Apr. '56	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60	Nov. '57
	(806)	(800)	(1198)	(613)		(863)	(813)	(1195)	(1258)	(599)	(599)	(845)
U.S.	35%	37%	36%		25%	37%	31%	38%	36%		29%	38%
U.S.S.R.	25	34	34	NA	44	22	21	21	20	NA	29	23
Both equally strong(Vol.)	15	11	11		10	14	24	25	19		19	18
No opinion	25	18	19		21	27	24	16	25		23	21
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%
Net U.S. stronger	10	3	2		-19	15	10	17	16		0	15

No. of cases	France				Italy					
	(800)	(802)	(1220)	(608)	(911)	(807)	(1272)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S.	10%	9%	14%		25%	28%	29%	27%	31%	22%
U.S.S.R.	21	20	24	NA	14	14	25	19	16	24
Both equally strong(Vol.)	14	22	30		26	34	27	23	28	32
No opinion	55	49	32		35	24	19	31	25	22
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. stronger	-11	-11	-10		11	14	4	8	15	-2

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D. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT IRI REPORTS PERTAINING TO US-USSR STANDING

- R-2-60: The Impact of President Eisenhower's 11-Nation Tour on World Opinion: An Assessment
- R-22-60: U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology in Foreign Public Opinion
- R-25-60: Western European Public Reaction to Current Disarmament and Test Ban Talks
- R-27-60: The Free World's Image of the Soviet Union: A Tentative Appraisal
- R-47-60: Latin American Opinion on U.S. Economic Policies and Private Investment

- RN-19-60: Public Opinion Abroad and U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology
- RN-20-60: Pioneer V and Tiros I: A Summary of Free World Reaction
- RN-22-60: Reaction to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks
- RN-25-60: Free World Reactions to Selected International Issues
- RN-28-60: Free World Reactions to President Eisenhower's Far Eastern Trip

- FE-23-60: The Comparative Image of the U.S. Versus the Communist Powers Among Philippine University Students
- NE-6-60: Free World Versus Communist Bloc Standing in the Four Major Cities of India
- WE-61-60: The Impact of the Current Cold-War Detente Upon Trends in U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standings
- WE-62-60: West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris Summit Conference. I. General Standing of the U.S. Versus the U.S.S.R. in an Atmosphere of Detente
- WE-63-60: West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris Summit Conference. II. U.S. or U.S.S.R. The Wave of the Future?
- WE-64-60: Post-Summit Trends in British and French Opinion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- WE-65-60: Post-Summit Trends in West German Opinion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- WE-66-60: Post-Summit Trends in Norwegian Opinion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- WE-67-60: British Views on U.S. vs U.S.S.R. Standing on Specific Aspects of Space Achievement

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MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/NE

Mr. Cooper

Don't you think that the thrust of this should be included in the new Estimate of the World Situation? However, intangible, it is a key factor in the changing power balance. Bill Morell is giving it considerable play in his power study.



Bob Komer

STAT

13 October 1960
(DATE)

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FREE WORLD VIEWS OF THE US-USSR POWER BALANCE

R-54-60

August 29, 1960

This report is not a statement of USIA policy.

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FOREWORD

This report, originally requested as an informal contribution to a government study, is being issued in this series as of general interest to the Agency.

It comprises a summary of general trends and highlights; a series of regional discussions of the comparative power images held; and summary tabulations of data from available public opinion surveys that have a significant relation to aspects of the power confrontation. There is also appended a list of recent IRI reports bearing on the subject.

No uniformity of approach has been attempted in the regional sections of the report, in view of the diversity of factors that are locally active in shaping impressions of US and Soviet power, and regional disparities in the nature and availability of evidence regarding opinions and attitudes. What has been sought in these sections is to permit the issues to be seen within the context of regional history, preoccupations, and concerns.

It should be borne in mind that both the nature of the questions at issue, and the nature and fragmentariness of the evidence available, mean that overall analysis of foreign views on relative US-USSR power is necessarily generalized and tentative. As the report suggests, the nature of power itself, as it is measured by foreign opinion, is in the course of evolution, and the circumstances in which power would be applied are not seen as a constant by any audience.

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SECRETFREE WORLD VIEWS OF THE US-USSR POWER BALANCE*A. GENERAL TRENDS AND HIGHLIGHTS

1. The concept of national power in international relations is currently undergoing redefinition in the public mind. In this process, the elements that constitute power, the ways in which power is applied, and the context in which power is envisaged and assessed, are all being significantly revised and extended. In this continuing flux, no clear and controlling concept, and no final verdict on power-in-being or on relative power positions holds decisive sway, although a number of the factors that influence popular judgments can be discerned, as well as the current general direction of those judgments.

2. Current views of relative US-USSR power have changed sharply since the advent of the first Sputnik and the development of intercontinental missile capabilities. Prior to these events, prevalent opinion was that the US enjoyed a clear preponderance of power. The current consensus would appear to be that the USSR now enjoys a rough but effective equivalence in strength overall. Behind in some fields, ahead in others, the USSR is seen as capable of offering a credible competitive challenge to the US in the major arenas of international rivalry.

3. The trend is adverse to the US; despite some fluctuations, and area variations, impressions of Soviet power superiority or gains seem to be rising in public opinion rather than falling. Anticipations of what the trend in power will be -- popular estimates of which nation will emerge generally strongest in a peaceful competition over the next few decades -- in most available indicators favor the USSR.

4. In the critical areas of military strength and space achievements and a rate of economic growth capable of supporting them at a high level, popular opinion in most West European countries, presumably the best informed and closely linked by interest and history, believes the US to be inferior to the USSR, although more sophisticated opinion may perceive a rough balance. In these specific fields, too, the trend is adverse. Elsewhere, most opinion is divided on military strength, with the predominant belief apparent that a nuclear stalemate prevails. However, in almost all areas, expectations appear to be that the USSR will achieve military superiority, although there is probably no clear concept of what this superiority will consist of, or what its significance will be.

5. In most parts of the world, the USSR is believed to lead the US in space achievements. This impression, stemming from the first Sputnik and strengthened by its aftermath, appears to have sometimes a durability impervious to fact, sometimes a volatility suggesting that it could be readily modified by sensational developments. Given the present capabilities of both sides, it is probable that the most favorable verdict the US can hope to elicit on its space performance will be the expectation of a see-saw pattern.

6. Virtually without exception, world opinion is now convinced that the USSR has made tremendous economic progress over the past decade. So much, in fact, that the gap between it and the US, which is still acknowledged to have the world's most powerful economy, is rapidly being closed. Concurrent with the widely held view that the USSR's current rate of economic

* The reader should be cautioned that this assessment does not include the reactions to the Soviet Union's latest triumph -- the successful recovery of its "second cosmic space ship" with its dog passengers.

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growth is substantially higher than that of the US, is the general tendency -- even in highly industrialized Western Europe -- to suspect that within the foreseeable future the USSR might even surpass the US in overall economic strength.

7. Popular acceptance of the idea that a "nuclear stalemate" obtains appears to be increasing; it may be the most widely held single view on relative US-USSR power. It does not necessarily conceive US-USSR strength as equal; it is based rather on the view that no margin of superiority is likely to be decisive in a nuclear war, since the side that initiated major hostilities would incur unacceptable retaliatory damage in turn. This view is less a judgment on ratios of strength than a belief that strength is held in an equilibrium of deterrence, "the balance of terror." The concept of such a deadlock seems to have rational and emotional attractiveness to foreign audiences: (1) Such a military stalemate appears to lessen the danger that either side would deliberately resort to force and is thus wishfully welcomed; (2) A balance of this kind appears to hold for third powers the prospect that their own international influence could assume expanded, perhaps decisive, weight; (3) It permits reader maintenance or assumption of neutralist positions by eliminating the attraction of a possible victor -- it is easier to be neutral if no one is going to win.

8. A nuclear stalemate carries for many the implication that the US-USSR rivalry will be resolved in alternative arenas. If major modern armaments are seen as unemployable to enforce settlement of the US-USSR competition, greater weight and decisiveness are given to other aspects of strength -- on the one hand, the political, economic, psychological, and ideological facets of a peaceful international competition; on the other, the ability successfully to fight a geographically limited war, a war with conventional weapons, or to intervene forcibly (directly or indirectly) in a local situation.

9. There appears to be a preponderance of belief that the USSR rather than the US would win a conventional war; there appears uncertainty whether wars could be confined to local areas or conventional weapons. In Western Europe, opinion seems convinced that any war between the major powers would be a nuclear war, and could not be localized; in areas where the interests of the greater powers do not appear so critically or manifestly engaged, the possibility of local and limited wars seems to have wider acceptance.

10. The sources of the public impression that the USSR has closed or is closing the power gap appear to be primarily:

a. Widespread belief that the Soviets lead in space achievements, and that these can be equated directly with military capability, and to a lesser extent with overall scientific and technical development and with the efficacy of the Soviet system.

b. The greatly expanded international presence of the USSR, which has appeared in recent years to be exerting influence and leverage in areas which had hitherto been denied it or where it had hitherto been inactive.

c. The confident tone and aggressive posture of the USSR, which has appeared to be speaking and acting from assumed strength. This assumption has apparently been lent credibility less by Soviet propaganda efforts than by concrete Soviet actions or successes, and by the apparent corroboration given Soviet claims by Western reaction. US expressions of public and official concern regarding the challenge of Soviet power appear

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to have been a significant element in validating the Soviet posture.

d. Doubts that the US has succeeded in effectively organizing and focussing the resources of the Western alliance, or that the US has shown itself fully effective in bring its own power to bear on its objectives.

e. Soviet foreign economic programs, that despite their comparatively restricted size have had high impact and visibility, through selective deployment and timing for maximum effect; these have helped to create the image of a productive and accelerating Soviet economy, especially in underdeveloped areas.

f. An impression of Soviet ruthlessness and fixity of purpose, combined with the impression that the Soviet people have greater faith in their principles, and are willing to work harder, than the people of the US. This view has not served to raise USSR in general esteem over the US, nor can it be equated with admiration for Communist institutions or doctrine, but presumably contributes to raising popular estimates of overall Soviet capabilities.

g. In Asia particularly, the belief that Communist China, with its massive population, has shown tremendous economic growth and dynamism makes it clear a substantial increment to Communist bloc strength -- a belief qualified, probably, by the sense that this strength is currently more potential than actual, and by some uncertainty about the ultimate correspondence of Communist Chinese and Soviet interests. In much of the Far East (notably excluding Japan) the impact of Soviet power is still relatively slight; Communist China is the basic power against which the US is measured in Southeast Asia, and Soviet power is sometimes also viewed as a force to be measured against that of Communist China.

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B. REGIONAL ANALYSESWESTERN EUROPEIntroduction

The question "How do Western Europeans currently rank the United States and the Soviet Union on the international balance of power scale in view of their worldwide rivalry?" is not easily answered for two major reasons -- both of which are highly subjective in character.

The first difficulty is inherent in the initial and personal decision regarding the relative weight to be assigned to each of the three major sectors of opinion; to political opinion as revealed in official government policy, parliamentary debates and public political speeches; newspaper opinion as reflected in editorials and feature commentaries; and man-in-the-street opinion as indicated by public opinion surveys. However, given the kind of democratic political society that prevails throughout most of Western Europe, this appraisal arbitrarily assumes that political opinion is the most important, followed fairly closely by press opinion and at some considerable distance by man-in-the-street opinion.

The second major difficulty stems from the lack of any commonly agreed on current yardsticks for measuring the relative power-standing vis-a-vis each other of such super-states as the United States and the Soviet Union. Although there is a fairly firm consensus as to what constitutes international power in the abstract -- military strength, economic might, scientific-technological skill and moral stature -- there is no corresponding agreement as to the relative importance of these various power-components within the context of the current US-USSR worldwide rivalry. For basic to any meaningful and realistic ordering is the subjective determination as to whether this rivalry will remain peaceful -- i.e., confined to the struggle for the minds and stomachs of mankind -- or whether it will eventually erupt into nuclear war. In either event, this appraisal again arbitrarily assumes that Western European opinion regards military strength -- "Who can beat whom?" -- and the will to use it as the acid tests of power in the current scientific nuclear-missile age, followed fairly closely by economic might and some considerable distance by moral stature.

The Pre-Sputnik Image: Unchallenged US Dominance

From the vantage point of the present, it seems clear that "Sputnik I" and the cumulative American reaction to its manifold implications represent a major watershed in the Western European evaluation of the relative power standing of the United States and the Soviet Union. For, prior to the advent of the space or missile age in October 1957, few Western Europeans seem to have entertained any real doubts about American military, scientific, economic and moral superiority vis-a-vis the USSR and the American intention of using this superiority for the general good of mankind -- at least for mankind in the free world.

The fact that the United States could expose the Soviet Union to nuclear destruction while the latter could not effectively retaliate in kind -- the basis of the Dulles "massive retaliation" doctrine -- was universally regarded as concrete evidence of American military superiority. A superiority, moreover, which most Western Europeans believed was implicitly acknowledged by the Soviet Union itself. For, following the formation in 1949 of the North Atlantic defense system based on US nuclear might, there were no further direct Soviet challenges to the territorial status quo of Western Europe.

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The fact that the United States had the highest standard of living of any nation in the world was viewed as indisputable proof of American economic superiority. A superiority, moreover, which was clearly demonstrated by the ease with which the United States carried the tremendous burden of the postwar economic reconstruction of Western Europe -- the Marshall Plan -- and furnished increasing amounts of economic and technical assistance to other needy regions.

The fact that on virtually all levels of American society there was mass ownership of products of American scientific-technological ingenuity -- cars, radios, television sets, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, etc. -- was generally regarded as incontrovertible proof of the validity of the traditional picture of American scientific-technological pre-eminence. A superiority, moreover, which had been clearly demonstrated in the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and in the means of delivering them to their intended targets.

The fact that the United States was an open and democratic society -- one which was clearly dedicated in principle to the Western European liberal ideal of individual freedom, liberty and equality of opportunity -- was generally considered to be strong evidence of the moral superiority of American society vis-a-vis its dictatorial and regimented Soviet counterpart. A superiority, moreover, which was clearly manifested in American goodwill and benevolence towards most nations in the difficult postwar era and in its assumption of the unsolicited role of defender of the free world against the march of international communism.

The Post-Sputnik Image: US Dominance Seriously Questioned

Under the cumulative impact of Soviet spectacular "firsts" in rocket developments and the continuing chorus of sharp American self-criticism most Western Europeans have been shocked into a drastic -- and perhaps excessive -- revision of their pre-sputnik image of general Soviet inferiority to the United States. Accompanying this re-evaluation of the USSR as a dynamic and powerful military-economic-and-scientific complex has been a concomitant re-examination of the continuing validity of the pre-sputnik image of invincible American power and unquestioned world dominance.

Currently, most Western Europeans are convinced that the balance of military power no longer favors the United States as it formerly did. For, in their opinion, the Soviet leapfrog development of a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile has cancelled out the pre-sputnik American advantage of being able to rain nuclear destruction upon the Soviet Union while being virtually immune to a similar Soviet attack.

While sophisticated political and press opinion tends to regard the current military situation as one of nuclear stalemate in which neither of the two super-powers has any material advantage over the other, the more impressionistic popular opinion has seemingly concluded from Soviet boasts of superiority and American admissions of a temporary "missile gap" that the United States is not only currently militarily inferior to the USSR but will continue to be so for the next decade or two as well. Nevertheless, popular opinion is in complete accord with sophisticated opinion in holding that a major war between the US and the USSR is most unlikely in the present circumstances because, regardless of their relative military strengths, each still has the capability of inflicting terrible destruction upon the other. In short, regardless of differences of opinion about the relative military strengths of the world's two super-states, there is universal acceptance of the Churchillian thesis that "mutuality of terror" is a major deterrent to war in the nuclear age.

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Although convinced that the Soviet Union's recent success in redressing the military balance vis-a-vis the United States has paradoxically reduced the danger that either protagonist would deliberately resort to war as a means of resolving their differences, Western European opinion -- at least on the more sophisticated political and press levels -- is currently disturbed by two possible (albeit contradictory) implications of the post-sputnik military situation. First, the possibility of war by miscalculation -- that is, the fear that war might inadvertently result from a Soviet miscalculation as to how far it can exploit the current nuclear stalemate for the attainment of limited objectives, such as the takeover of West Berlin, for instance. And second, the possibility that "Western Europe could no longer reckon unconditionally upon the protection of America's atomic shield in the event of limited conflicts" -- that is, the fear that the United States might consider the possible nuclear destruction of an American city (such as New York or Chicago or Los Angeles) as too high a price to pay for resolutely opposing a limited Soviet aggression, such as the takeover of West Berlin or Helsinki, for example.

While Western European opinion still subscribes to the view that the United States is indubitably the world's economic leader and leagues ahead of the Soviet Union, its closest rival, of late increasing doubts -- particularly on the more sophisticated political and press levels -- have developed about the continuing supremacy of the American economy. Contributing to these growing reservations have been four major developments.

First, the general agreement that the Soviet Union's boasts of tremendous economic strides in the postwar era have a firm foundation in fact, as evidenced by such objective standards as the visible improvement in its level of living, its deep and continuing penetration of the aluminum, asbestos and oil export markets (to mention just a few) and its increasing foreign aid programs such as the ambitious Aswan Dam project on the Nile. Second, the widespread currency and authenticity that American reports, both official and private, have given to the USSR's claim that its economy is growing at an appreciably faster rate than that of the United States and that the gap between the two is being rapidly closed -- a claim which Western Europeans find easy to accept (even without American confirmation) in view of their own superior rate of economic growth over the past decade. Third, the visible faltering of the American economy on at least four major occasions in the past fifteen years, most particularly the 1957-58 recession and the current economic difficulties. And fourth, the apparent concern of the United States -- as indicated by its current exports drive and sponsorship of the still-to-be-born Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development -- that it can no longer singlehandedly carry the increasing burden of economic assistance to the developing nations of the world in direct competition with the USSR.

The pre-sputnik Western European image of the United States as the leading scientific-technological nation in the world has likewise been sharply eroded of late under the cumulative impact of the Soviet Union's spectacular successes with outerspace satellites -- largely because of the widespread layman's tendency to equate them with a high degree of scientific-technological attainment in general. Although the almost universal acceptance of Soviet superiority in rocketry has resulted in an across-the-board upgrading of Soviet science and technology, Western European opinion is still inclined to believe that the United States leads the USSR in the application of science for the general welfare of mankind. In addition, the more sophisticated opinion holds that American outerspace research, while less spectacular than its Soviet counterpart, is contributing more to man's basic scientific knowledge and eventual control of outerspace.

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While the moral stature of the United States as a nation dedicated to freedom and liberty remains as high as ever, a number of developments have combined of late to induce in Western European opinion -- particularly on the sophisticated political and press levels -- increasing doubts about the continuing American ability to provide the kind of imaginative and responsive leadership required by changing world conditions, such as the shift in Soviet strategy from the crude "cold war" philosophy of Stalin to the more subtle challenge posed by Khrushchev's "peaceful but competitive coexistence" philosophy.

A highly selective listing of the major events leading to this Western European questioning of American leadership during the past two-and-a-half years would of necessity include the following: the alleged tardy American recognition of the military and psychological challenge posed by the Soviet Union's spectacular series of "firsts" in outerspace developments; the alleged hiatuses in the conduct of American foreign policy occasioned by internal bickering, the illness of high US officials and elections; the alleged amateurish bungling which led to the Soviet torpedoing of the much-heralded Paris summit conference and the Geneva disarmament talks; the alleged failure to prevent the division of Western Europe into two potentially rival economic groupings; and the alleged inability of the Eisenhower administration to exercise effective and unified control over the complex governmental machinery concerned with foreign affairs.

Conclusions

Three major conclusions are suggested by the preceding analysis of current Western European opinion of the relative power standing of the United States and the Soviet Union. First, that the past few years have witnessed a sharp deterioration in the pre-sputnik Western European image of American military, economic, scientific and moral superiority vis-a-vis the USSR. Second, that during this same period Western European opinions have drastically revised its pre-sputnik view of the USSR as a generally backward nation to the current image of a modern dynamic and powerful military-economic-and-scientific complex -- one, moreover, which has already taken giant strides towards redressing the balance with the United States. And third, that Western European opinion is inclined to the "safe" view that the United States and the USSR will become progressively more equal in overall strength over the course of time, with neither having any appreciable military or economic or scientific advantage over the other.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAArab StatesIntroduction

Given the absence of survey data for the Arab countries, any assessment of Arab opinion must be derived wholly from the radio and press and from private expressions of opinion, including those of officials -- the latter often more rational and moderate than that publicly expressed. Recognition must be given to the Arabs' volatile nature and subjective outlook through which events are measured in extreme terms according to the interests of the Arab "nation" and reactions shaped by recent history: the continuing existence of Israel, the intense bias against "Western imperialism," and the commitment of Soviet bloc political, military, and economic support to the Arab world.

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Leadership

Arab opinion in recent months has tended to view the United States as a nation increasingly isolated and declining in prestige primarily because of "mistaken" policies and conflicting pressures within American society. There has been some contrast, however, between private and publicly expressed opinion with the latter denouncing US policies in extreme terms -- under government direction in the case of the UAR (because of dependence upon Soviet economic and military aid) and in other areas impelled by a desire to humiliate the US because of the Israeli issue. While private Arab opinion largely blamed the Soviet Union for the collapse of the Summit meeting, US judgment on the handling of the U-2 flight was seriously questioned. (The revelation of such flights occurring over a four-year period had the paradoxical effect of enhancing American military capability in Arab eyes, however). Because of Israel, Arabs have tended to view American policy-making as "confused" and subordinated to "Zionism, imperialism, and reactionary influences" -- Western democracy in this respect tends to be regarded as decadent. The events in Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Cuba have been interpreted both as a defeat for America in supporting "unpopular" regimes (not necessarily dictatorships) and as an overwhelming vindication of Arab beliefs concerning military pacts and bases. Exclusive of the Communist press, there has been little effort in this context to vindicate Soviet policy, but Arab private opinion credits the USSR with having emerged in a stronger position. Arabs, however, have derided US statements concerning Communists in Cuba and Japan as another reflection of the US "failure" to recognize the force of nationalism. Some press accounts noted that the Japanese were not anti-American but opposed to military bases as "proved" by the favorable reception given Eisenhower in India.

There are indications that some Arab opinion at least tends to credit Soviet military power -- as measured by the effect of its retaliatory threats -- with having induced the violent Japanese reaction and more recently, with having "frustrated" US designs on the Congo. It is likely that, aside from aspects of policy and leadership, most Arabs tend to equate the US and the USSR in terms of overall power admitting an American edge in economic strength. This rough equation gives rise to the resentful fear that a detente -- affecting the Near East and in which Arabs will not be consulted -- may at some time take place. In this narrow context, Arabs tended to look privately upon the Summit collapse with favor. Most Arabs now hope that neutral forces will play a larger role for the purpose of protecting such third party interests and taking advantage of American "defeats."

Military

Arabs tend to regard the US and the USSR as about even in available military strength but most would probably credit America with greater military capability given her superior economic resources. They would regard the West today as the probable winner of a hot war and would look with alarm at the prospect of being aligned on the Soviet side in such a conflict at the present time. Most informed Arabs were privately pleased with the knowledge that the U-2 flights had taken place for four years and regarded the U-2 as a first-class technical achievement while expressing some skepticism about Soviet military defenses. They also expressed admiration for the flights as a reflection of American "toughness." Arabs are fully aware of the nuclear capability of both powers and tend to feel that a total conflict (inevitably involving the Middle East) is more likely than a limited war. (The Summit collapse apparently gave rise to genuine fears in this regard.) Informed Arabs are also aware of the growing strength of the Soviet economy and its military strength as measured by the increasing Soviet threats to Western military installations in the Middle and Far

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East -- threats to which Arabs have given at least some credence in the cases of Suez, Japan, and the Congo.

Alliance System

There has been no change in the deep-seated Arab opposition to military alliances and foreign bases. Recent events in Japan and the Congo for example, have intensified and, in Arab eyes, vindicated such opposition with the result that Arabs would like to believe that the Western base system is collapsing. They have attributed the weakening of alliances first to local opposition and secondarily to the U-2 affair and increasing Soviet pressure against the host countries. There appears to be no firm evidence that they equate this belief with a net decline in American military power. They contend privately and publicly, however, that U.S. prestige and influence have declined and that the combined power of neutral nations will fill the vacuum.

Scientific

Arabs probably rate the US ahead of the USSR in overall scientific and technological achievement thus retaining the conventional view of American pre-eminence in these fields and bearing in mind the American lead in nuclear developments and application, and the widely recognized superior economic power of the United States. Soviet space achievements nevertheless have had a spectacular and generally favorable impact but the initial Arab impression of a Soviet lead in this narrower field may have been modified so as to view both powers as about even. It is probable that many Arabs tend to link space accomplishments with military capability and make little differentiation between scientific, military, (or) propaganda space ventures.

Economic

Most informed Arabs are aware of American economic superiority relative to the USSR and have a marked admiration for the US standard of living, recognizing Soviet drawbacks in the latter respect. However, the massive economic aid given by the Bloc to the UAR and Iraq during a period of extreme anti-Western feeling had the effect of portraying Moscow as "the greatest friend of the Arabs." This local outlook has since been modified by subsequent Arab reservations concerning Communist inroads in Iraq. Arab opinion tends to credit the USSR (and to some extent Communist China) with notable achievements in social welfare and industrialization and regards their ruthless fixity of purpose as worthy of application in the Arab world, although with avoidance of the human cost involved. A late 1957 survey of Arab student opinion at the American University of Beirut indicated that nearly half believed the Soviet Union would surpass America in economic strength in the next 25 years.

While Arabs would be inclined generally to accept "unconditional" aid from both sides and have done so (Yemen, Iraq, UAR), they remain predisposed to look first to the West. There is some unmeasured Arab opinion holding that Soviet aid projects which emphasize industrialization are more pertinent for their needs than American programs which Arabs feel are overly concerned with agriculture.

Greece, Turkey and Iran

Introduction

The proportion of the number of persons to the country's total population observed thinking aloud on the topics included in this report

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tends to decrease as one looks first at Greece, next at Iran, and finally at Turkey. Yet, all three countries share in common experiences which predispose them to view such matters either as favorable to the United States, or, in times of temporary setback to the US, with considerable equanimity. Thus, they have in common the memory of US strength and leadership exhibited in World War II, the successful employment of US pressure against Communist/Soviet encroachment on their territory during the late 1940's, and US military and economic aid given to their countries since World War II. Most recently, they have witnessed US defiance of Soviet threats against the West. Moreover, membership of each of these countries in a Western defensive alliance, whether it be NATO or CENTO, does afford at least to the government leaders and military participants in NATO or CENTO exercises a better realization of the actual strength of the United States than if their countries were not within these alliances.

The Eisenhower Doctrine and the defense treaty with each country growing out of that declaration have, it appears, given these governments a sense of protection, and has thereby served to decrease -- but not entirely eliminate -- their critical review of the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet bloc. This is not to say, however, that each government is above using, on occasion, such observations as a pretext to wheedle more aid from the United States. Nor does it mean that opposition elements, particularly in Iran, like such a guarantee when it appears to keep the governing group in power.

In Iran the majority of the public probably would favor a modification of Iran's policy in line with the traditional stance of playing one great power off against another. At present, most Iranians who advocate this change in policy probably feel that the "cold war" will continue indefinitely, with neither bloc gaining much preponderance over the other. Among those Iranians who fear that a "hot war" might come any time, there probably is a desire for Iran to break away from the alliance in order to seek the comparative security of neutralism.

American officials returning from Turkey report that even the Turks who talk about East-West relations seldom go much further in their thinking than to assume that if the United States is against the "Russians" (Turkey's traditional enemy), then surely the Russians can be stopped -- for one Turk is always worth two Russians. The Greeks tend to be the most vocal of the three nationalities on these power subjects and there are probably more shades of opinion concerning them in Greece than in either Turkey or Iran.

Currently the press in Greece affords a fairly reliable index of what the public is thinking on these issues. In Turkey this is also true, despite the fact that the press is now saying very little on such matters, due to public preoccupation with internal developments under the new regime. In Iran, on the other hand, the press usually reflects only official thinking (or direction) on these issues. If that opinion sometimes coincides with the public's opinion, it is usually coincidental.

Leadership

In all three countries the United States is viewed as a well-intentioned but, on occasion, inept leader of the Free World. The Turks are constantly worried that the US will be tricked by the USSR into a false sense of security. The Iranians feel that the US is leading Iran along a dangerous path of all-out opposition to the Soviet Union, which can at any time lead to a "hot war" and place Iran directly on the firing line. The Shah is concerned that the US will concentrate so much on a nuclear war that it will overlook the possibility of a conventional and regionally localized

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war in which Iran will have to cope with encroachments from bordering areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The majority of Iranians (that is a majority of those who think about such matters) believe that the US exhibits naivete in pouring so much aid into Iran without carefully checking on how that aid is being spent. In Greece the United States was criticized by a number of newspapers for its "clumsy" handling of the U-2 incident, but although these same papers expressed a desire to see the return of "old and experienced" French and Britain influence in Western councils, they probably have remained convinced that both France and Britain have lost their one-time influence in world affairs. Many Greeks, according to Embassy Athens, felt that through the U-2 incident and the subsequent collapse of the Summit conference, the United States had allowed the Soviets to regain the propaganda offensive against the West.

Military

The Turks are the most inarticulate about US military strength. Nonetheless, army officers and civilian leaders have expressed concern that the Soviet bloc might overtake the US in military strength within the next decade or so unless the US increases its own strength and that of its allies. Each American success in the missile field, therefore, probably enhances Turkish confidence in US military strength. In Greece, there apparently has been some doubt felt by the public that the US is keeping up with the USSR in the missile race. But the recent success in the firing of the Polaris missile from submarines has elicited favorable press reaction concerning the redress of balance of Western power versus the Soviet Union. In Iran, the successful launchings by the United States of satellites and military missiles during the last few years have, it seems, wiped out any inclinations by Iranians to ascribe undue military significance to Soviet achievements along these lines. Iran's two leading newspapers, Ettela'at and Kayhan, were particularly impressed by the failure of the Soviet Union to follow up its threat to bomb air bases after the RB-47 incident. But what does seem to both some Iranians (and especially the Shah) is the idea that the East and the West have reached a nuclear stalemate and, therefore, have made a conventional war more likely, if and when a war should break out. It is in the realm of conventional warfare that they fear the US is allowing itself and its allies to fall behind.

Alliance System

The vast majority of Greeks and Turks staunchly support their governments' membership in NATO (Greece and Turkey) and CENTO (Turkey). A majority of the Iranian public, however, does not enthusiastically support their country's membership in CENTO. These Iranians would prefer their country to return to a neutral stance so that 1) it might play one great power off against the other, 2) it might avoid provocation of the Soviet Union, and 3) the Shah's unpopular regime might lose the strong American support which they believe it now enjoys. In both Greece and Iran the press indicated, at the time of the cancellation of the President's trip to Japan, that it appeared that the US alliance system in the Far East was beginning to crumble due, it said, to a combination of Communist agitation and American support of unpopular regimes. Iranians, in particular, are still greatly impressed by the 1958 coup in Iraq and that country's subsequent (1959) withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. In Greece and Turkey, the governments, supported by their publics, have remained unshaken by Soviet threats of retaliation against Western military installations. Such threats did, however, stir up a demand in the Greek press (representing both pro-government and opposition opinion) that the government assure the Greek people that Greece retained the right to exercise control over reconnaissance flights. In Iran, although the (government-controlled)

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press contended that Iran retained the right to permit such flights in the future, these sentiments probably did not reflect Iranian opinion.

Scientific

In all three countries the majority opinion probably holds that the United States is ahead in the fields of science and technology, except in the missile field, and will likely remain ahead, or at least even, with the Soviet Bloc during the next 25 years.

Economic

The elite in Turkey tend to feel that, although at present the US is ahead in economic development, the USSR is rapidly catching up and may within the next 25 years overtake the US. (Based on a survey in June 1958 of students of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Ankara. The results of this survey are believed to reflect general elite opinion, both civilian and military.) In Greece, on the other hand, according to a survey conducted in late 1958, public opinion felt that the US would emerge economically stronger than the USSR within the same time span; there is no reason to believe that this opinion has changed. In Iran, the Turkish attitude probably is shared by a majority of the Persian elite. While the Turks view this prospect of Soviet economic supremacy with considerable apprehension, the Iranians are probably less concerned.

There is considerable resistance among the elite in Iran and Turkey to acceptance of large-scale aid programs from the Soviet Bloc. In Greece, according to the survey mentioned above, more than half of the respondents were willing to accept aid from any country. Only a small minority expressed an unwillingness to accept aid from the Soviet Union.

South AsiaIntroduction

Newspaper editorials, the main source of impressions of South Asian attitudes on the following subjects, are not an accurate reflection of public opinion. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the press is government controlled; in Nepal the papers are frequently the mouthpiece for various political groups; and in India and Ceylon, where the press has had a relatively free voice on international issues, it is more critical of the Soviet Union and Communist China than is the general population. Except for India there is no public opinion survey data available, and even there the latest data is about a year old and is limited to urban, educated Indians. Many of the following assertions should therefore be regarded as "probably" or "possibly" true, and should be considered descriptive of the attitudes of the better-informed rather than of the rural, illiterate mass of the population whose opinions on such subjects are largely uncrystallized.

Leadership

The image of American statesmanship and leadership has suffered a setback as a result of several recent events, primarily the U-2 incident, the abortive Summit conference, the Japanese riots and the Cuban situation. Goodwill toward the United States is largely unimpaired, but doubts concerning its skill and ability to formulate and implement a successful foreign policy vis-a-vis the Communists has increased. South Asians are still disposed to accept the good intentions of the US, but its prestige and position as the leader of the Free World has fallen somewhat.

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Soviet belligerency and threats of military action against the US and its allies caused considerable apprehension, particularly in Pakistan, but also tended to increase the Soviet power image vis-a-vis the US. Pakistanis were also aware of the fate of several leaders whose governments, closely allied with the US, were overthrown in the past year or so. Under the impact of these various developments, many Pakistanis expressed strong reservations on the extent to which Pakistan could rely on the US for protection. Feeling was fairly widespread among the politically aware that Pakistan was a mere pawn in the East-West conflict whose loss would be a matter of regret to the US but, nevertheless, an acceptable minor setback in the larger struggle. Latent neutralist sympathies which had been suppressed for some time came to the surface in fairly strong form. In other South Asian countries, such as India, where existing non-alignment policies were firmly supported by public opinion, recent events were considered pointed justification for this policy; a rather vocal minority in India who had been advocating some form of regional anti-Communist pact became, for the time being at least, fairly quiet.

Military

The US and the USSR are viewed as of about equal military strength at the present time, although the Afghans partly because of physical proximity may be more impressed with Soviet military strength. However, the slightly predominant view in South Asia, particularly in India, is that time is on the side of the Soviets and it will not be too many more years before the USSR will be stronger militarily. Despite South Asian respect for power, this prospect is not looked upon with equanimity by Indians and Pakistanis, where the growing image of a powerful USSR arouses some apprehension. A military power balance between the two blocs is generally favored because it is considered that this balance is an effective deterrent to war. In times of crisis, fears that a nuclear war may be triggered off by some individual miscalculation are more frequently expressed in India than are assumptions that an East-West conflict can be contained to conventional warfare. Controlled nuclear disarmament is considered the primary disarmament objective.

Alliance System

The predominant attitude toward the US alliance system continues to be one of rather strong disapproval except in Pakistan, which is the sole South Asian member of SEATO and CENTO. Despite a more frequent expression of neutralist attitudes in Pakistan recently, there has been little if any public questioning of the membership in these two organizations. Sentiment has been expressed, however, that the US ought to assume greater obligations in CENTO. On the other hand, alleged inefficiency and lack of coordination in Washington have raised some doubts that the US could be relied on to act decisively and with sufficient speed to help Pakistan if it were attacked.

Scientific

The USSR is considered about equal to the US in the general scientific field and perhaps slightly superior to the US in space science. Soviet space achievements are for the most part responsible for the rapid upward reevaluation of Soviet scientific capabilities in the last few years. New advances in space science capture far less attention than earlier ones, however, and it would require some very dramatic achievement by the US to balance the Soviet's lead in the public mind. At present the general opinion is that the USSR will have the edge over the US in the general field of science in a few years time.

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Economic

The US is considered somewhat ahead of the USSR at the present time, and far ahead of Communist China in economic strength. In ten or twenty years time, however, the general belief is that the USSR will be an economic equal of the US, if not slightly superior. There is, however, little if any interest in the strictly regimented economic system of the Communist bloc, despite an acknowledgement that economic goals can possibly be reached faster by such methods. A mixed economy is strongly favored.

The predominant attitude is that economic aid from both Communist and non-Communist countries is desirable providing no strings are attached. Pakistanis, however, resent the large amounts of US aid given "neutral" countries like India, and Afghans feel that the US is not as dynamic in extending aid as it should be. Both Afghans and Indians deplore U.S. military aid, particularly that given to Pakistan.

AFRICAIntroduction

Africans view the American and Soviet power structures in terms of their own apprehensions and desires. They are overwhelmingly concerned with independence, socio-economic development and the preservation of "positive neutralism." They have only a tangential interest in the Cold War, except as it directly impinges upon Africa. Knowledge and opinion about the Soviet Union are in the formative stage. Africans have a greater, if sometimes distorted, awareness of the US, including the negative as well as the positive aspects. Furthermore, they tend to associate the US with European colonial powers -- by race, culture, military alliance, and African policy.

There are very serious limitations to the data available for an assessment of the American power image in Africa. The very few available opinion surveys confirm that the US stands well above the Soviet Union in overall esteem but the surveys have not elicited African views on the various categories covered below. This assessment, therefore, relies primarily upon statements by government officials and other articulate leaders -- the statements are neither numerous nor detailed on the particular items involved -- upon newspaper editorials, very limited survey data, and impressionistic insights. The fact that Africans are just beginning to relate themselves to the rest of the world accounts for the absence of a perspective against which to interpret current African opinion.

Leadership

Their demand for strong government at home conditions Africans to respect forceful and wise leadership elsewhere in the world. During the past year particularly, many Africans have felt that Khrushchev has seized the initiative around the world and that American leadership has been increasingly on the defensive. Some sections of the African press have linked together the U-2, Summit collapse, Japan, Turkey, and Cuba as evidence of the decline of American prestige and leadership. Khrushchev's arrogance at Paris did much to redress the earlier inclination to criticize

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severely American "blunders" in the timing and subsequent handling of the U-2 incident. Except in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which were directly involved, there was little African reaction to the President's foreign tours, except that the cancellation of the visit to Japan was viewed as a set-back to American prestige. Conscious of their own inability to assume a decisive role in world politics, Africans argue that both the US and the USSR fail in their grave responsibilities toward all mankind. Africans continue to look to Washington for positive leadership (in French tropical Africa, however, DeGaulle is probably the most highly esteemed world statesman) and feel that the US must exercise more initiative if the West is to cope with Moscow's world-wide efforts to undermine the West's position. Africans await a more dynamic American role in Africa and interpret the absence of it as proof that American leadership, deferring unnecessarily to the colonial powers, has not yet grasped the meaning of the new structure of world politics.

Military

By and large, African opinion tends to believe that the US is ahead of the Soviet Union in total military power but that the margin is shrinking rapidly. Increasingly the USSR is held to be equal or slightly superior to the US in missile capability and a survey in Nigeria indicates that college students believe that the USSR will lead the US in overall military posture after two decades of coexistence. There has been relatively little African attention to the capacity of both sides to engage each other in limited warfare but Africans are very aware that either side can wage nuclear and missile warfare at the present time. Apprehension over the possibility that all-out nuclear war could be provoked by accident or inflamed passions, Africans disapprove of what they believe to be sporadic reckless behavior on both sides -- for example the U-2 incident. The U-2 affair reinforced overwhelming opposition to foreign military bases on African soil, an opposition which now extends to space-tracking stations which Africans fear may have military implications involving them in the Cold War. Africans hold that both countries are endangering all mankind by exorbitant expenditures on armaments and that neither has worked hard enough towards arms reduction. Some Africans think that the US is overly cautious about a disarmament agreement with the Soviets; Khrushchev's UN disarmament speech in 1959 was well received in some quarters and the US was urged to approach it with utmost sincerity and a "proper respect" for the fears of mankind.

In their propaganda to Africa the Soviets have not boasted of their military capability as much as they have of their readiness to repel American or NATO "military aggression." They have, however, hammered at the theme of American military encirclement of the Orbit and particularly of American efforts to drag Africa into this "Western aggressive bloc." The impact of this propaganda is largely unknown. While it probably has served to enhance the Soviet military posture in African eyes, Africans have tended to oppose any Big Power military venture in Africa and particularly outside of the UN. Thus it is at least probable that Soviet propaganda has not served to impair African views of US military strength.

Alliance System

African opinion about American involvement in military alliances is concentrated almost entirely upon NATO. The reasons for the existence of the alliance are eclipsed in African eyes by the widely-held persuasion that US deference to its Western allies is the single most important cause of the failure of the US wholeheartedly to support African aspirations for independence and socio-economic development. Nowhere is this more apparent

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then in long-standing African resentment -- particularly in North Africa -- over alleged American indifference to independence for Algeria. On the same grounds there has been very minor criticism of the US for not taking a stronger stand against Belgian military intervention in the Congo in July 1960. The feeling persists that the US supports European desires to associate Africa with the NATO system. For example, Moroccans in 1958 vigorously opposed what they believed to be a move to place the US bases in Morocco under NATO command. One aspect of peripheral interest in recent events in Korea, Japan, and Turkey is the feeling that the US supports "political corpses" primarily in the interest of maintaining her military alliances. Africans recognize that Soviet propaganda coincides with their own desires to be free of military pacts with the West, but also tend to recognize that such propaganda is calculated in the first instance to serve Moscow's and not Africa's objectives.

Scientific

African opinion places the US ahead of the USSR in total scientific achievement but believes that the Soviet Union has made remarkable strides in a short space of time. Soviet space accomplishments have made the largest single impact and tend in African minds to be taken as representative of total Soviet scientific capacity. In late 1959, following spectacular Soviet space successes, many Africans believed that the USSR had temporarily outstripped the US in this field but at the same time confidently expected the US to redress the balance. They may now believe that the US has done so. What most impresses African thinking -- the same applies to Soviet economic strength -- is the speed with which the USSR became a major scientific power. This attitude is based in part on a lack of knowledge of the scientific tradition inherited by the Soviets and in part on what Africans resentfully call the West's calculated downgrading of Soviet scientific capacity in the past. The US is generally placed ahead of the USSR in the teaching of science, and African students who have been to the Soviet Union unfavorably contrast Soviet restrictions upon scientific inquiry with unencumbered scientific experimentation in the US. There is some feeling that the Soviet system is better geared than is the American for rapid growth of science and technology and this attitude, together with Soviet space accomplishments, probably accounts for the belief in some quarters that in future years the Soviets may surpass the American scientific effort.

Economic

African opinion places the US ahead of the Soviet Union in total economic power but believes that the Soviets are steadily decreasing the margin. As in the case of scientific development, the pace of Soviet economic growth has made a considerable impact upon an underdeveloped Africa searching for the best approach to its own economic hurdles. Africans feel that the US economic system has been uniquely rewarding for the US but that it is not applicable to Africa's very different situation. Predisposed to a large governmental role in the economic sphere, African opinion respects the results that Communist organizational techniques can provide in a relatively short time. The organizational techniques and the pace of development largely account for a growing African belief that the Soviet economic system -- properly adapted to local circumstances -- represents the "wave of the future." These assumptions give rise to the impression that the Soviet centralized economic effort is inherently more powerful than an American capitalist system which they tend to view in nineteenth century terms. At the same time Africans are critical of excessive regimentation in the Soviet Union. They picture the US as fantastically wealthy but feel that the US does not use its economic abundance as judiciously as it might. Some tend to be critical of American "consumer waste"

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and believe that the US can and should devote more resources to Africa's economic development. They believe that American capacity to assist Africa exceeds Soviet capacity, but that the scarcity of American economic aid results from excessive American deference to the colonial powers.

FAR EASTSummary and Conclusions

The general trend of informed opinion in Southeast Asia seems to agree on the following propositions.

1. The image of US power has deteriorated while that of the Soviet Union has appreciated. In general, the United States still is regarded as the leading industrial nation of the world and as the leader in scientific and technological fields. The margin of US leadership has been narrowed, however, and it is considered as lagging in the missile race.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union is regarded as the leader in the missile field. The dramatic quality of its seizure of this position has rubbed off on its general power image in other scientific and industrial categories, but not enough yet to place it ahead of the United States in these general fields.

In sum, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be at a stand-off. This in itself, however, represents a considerable reduction in the stature of US power from its pre-1957 position when Sputnik was first launched into space.

2. As the US power image has faded, however, the recognition of the need for US power in Southeast Asia has increased. This largely resulted from the impact of the threatening acts of communism during 1959 in Tibet, along the Sino-Indian border, in Laos, and in Indonesia in the dispute over the Overseas Chinese there.

3. The compelling presence of Communist China in the area -- with its expansionism, its massive population and its tremendous economic growth -- provides the basic power against which that of the United States is measured in Southeast Asia. The impact of Soviet power is still relatively slight and is sometimes viewed in the area as a force to be measured against that of Communist China rather than with it.

Japanese opinion too agrees that US power has diminished relative to that of the Soviet Union, but also without providing a clear-cut opinion as to which is ahead. Unlike Southeast Asia, however, the Soviet Union remains the chief threat to Japanese security and Communist China's power potential is still undervalued.

The hopes, fears and doubts about American power in the region were reflected accurately in a recent series of remarks attributed to the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who made them during a recent informal discussion with a Western businessman. Rahman reflected an unwritten fear in the Far East that the United States will not use its power

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effectively to defend them when he observed that during World War II, "Asia was let go to the dogs." The common fear of Communist China was clearly present in Rahman's observation that China will dominate the Asia of the future. The Malayan leader went on to describe what he termed American "provocation" of Communist China over Taiwan and offshore islands as a cause for great concern in Southeast Asia. And finally, according to the report, Rahman declared that it was his belief that the Soviet Union would probably surpass the United States in productivity within 15 years, and that Communist China would probably not be far behind.

Southeast AsiaUS-Soviet Power

The change in the power images of the United States and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia is due almost entirely to the Soviet launching of the Sputnik in October 1957. The continued disparity in the size of rockets and the weight of the payloads has solidified Southeast Asian opinion that the Soviet Union indeed retains its rocket supremacy over the United States. This image is conditioned somewhat by limited recognition that the United States has engaged in more frequent space "shoots" and that these have been more meaningful in scientific terms than have the Soviet weight-lifting performances. But the dramatic quality of the first Sputnik, coupled with the fact that the Soviet achievement appeared to come from nowhere -- since the prevailing view was that the Soviets had only a poor scientific capability -- has not yet been matched by the United States. And the popular image has tended to place perhaps undue emphasis on the missile capability as the portent of the future, perhaps even as a rough rule-of-thumb of future overall military power.

The Soviet space achievements have, as a result, created a favorable setting for more serious Southeast Asian consideration of other scientific, technical and industrial accomplishments of the Soviet Union. The countries of Southeast Asia for example are now more prone to consider USSR offers of technical aid and to adopt textbooks and educational techniques from Moscow. The Soviet Union, in fact, has been moved up on the scale of modernized nations to a place second only to that of the United States.

Despite this dramatic upgrading of the Soviet Union, the US lead in industrialization, in technological know-how and in scientific stature is still recognized. Leaders in Southeast Asia are prone to balance Soviet rocketry against the more conventional US power apparatus. For the present, the US appears to hold a thin margin of lead in terms of the total components of power. But it is a fragile thing at best, for reports reveal that the Soviet Union is whittling away at the keystone of the US power image, total economic power. Surveys conducted among students in the Philippines (1958) and in South Viet-Nam (1959) continue to show a majority believing that the United States will retain its economic lead after 25 years; but 30-40 percent in both cases view such a long-term competition as ending either in a draw or are undecided. In the Philippines, one out of ten interviewed foresaw the Soviet Union ahead by that time. These opinions, coming from nations predisposed in favor of the US, do not reflect overwhelming confidence in the outcome.

An editorial in the Times of Viet-Nam on March 5, 1960, summed up the prevailing current of opinion on the respective US-Soviet power images:

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American protection has become questionable. The Soviet Union now possesses the nuclear bomb. American protection is no longer absolute. An association with the United States may become risky.

Appreciation of the Need for US Power

While American power may have deteriorated in competition with that of the Soviet Union, the appreciation of US power and the recognized need for its protective presence in the area is more commonly acknowledged now than ever before. Events in 1959, including such developments as the repression in Tibet, the threatening Laos crisis, the explosive Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Indonesian recriminations over the status of Overseas Chinese, have combined to produce an aura of uneasiness in the minds of Southeast Asian leaders and elites. Many chose neutralism as a practical recognition of the inherent vulnerability of their nations under pressure from two powerful blocs. Lulled by the talk of peaceful co-existence under the five principles evolved by Nehru and Chou En-lai, Southeast Asia believed it had found a reliable course upon which it could be free to conduct the necessary business of consolidating independence. The onslaught of Communist aggressive acts during 1959 shattered this euphoria.

The reaction in Southeast Asia showed elements of both resentment and fear. The Southeast Asians were resentful that their hopes for peaceful conditions were so rudely shattered in what seemed to them a denial of pledges of peace made to them repeatedly by the Communists. But they were fearful over the implied threat and power that the renewed belligerence appeared to hold in store. Many leaders and military men in particular reacted with a new appreciation of and expression of interest in US power in the area.

For virtually the first time it was directly acknowledged that in the final analysis, it was American military power which would determine the freedom or demise of the vulnerable countries of Southeast Asia, faced with the potential of Communist aggression. Two of the nations in the area most firmly committed to a course of neutralism, Indonesia and Burma, expressed their sentiments on this question guardedly but unmistakably. On several occasions during 1959 Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio indicated that he had a new appreciation for the presence of American forces in the Pacific and during a visit of American warships to Indonesia in November 1959, Subandrio privately stated that Indonesians consider the US Seventh Fleet a valuable protective screen. The army regime in Burma during 1959 too expressed similar sentiments. General Ne Win, then Premier of Burma, expressed an appreciation of SEATO and of American power in the area and a desire to have the US protective screen available.

9 / Thailand and the Philippines, allies and friends of the United States, have turned increasingly to SEATO as a result of the Communist belligerence. Surveys in both countries, but particularly in Thailand in 1957, 1958 and 1959, showed an increasing awareness of SEATO and a better appreciation of its value to their country and area. During the crisis in Laos in the early fall of 1959, many papers in the area for the first time reported that SEATO would have to act should UN intervention prove to be ineffective.

Cambodia's tentative turning toward a closer tie with Communist China as a result of the pressure of events in 1959 highlights the impact of fear of Communist China by neighboring states.

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om / The appreciation of US power and of the need for it has, however, been only a relatively recent phenomenon, even among many of our allies in the area. It is in part dependent upon recognition of the real threat posed by Communist aggression and subversion. The naked Communist threat to the area was readily apparent in 1959, but this will not always be true. Thus, the favorable attitudes toward US power may tend to vary considerably with circumstances and may depend in part on our avoidance of actions which could be viewed as "colonialist." It should be borne in mind also that even with the bald nature of the Communist actions in 1959, almost no prominent leader made a public announcement of his privately expressed desire for US military protection, and none of the neutralist nations abandoned their efforts to get along with both camps.

American Power Challenged by Communist China

The Communist aggressiveness which has aroused the fear of the Southeast Asian nations has come from Communist China rather than from the Soviet Union. The frequent hesitation of the area's leadership to give public utterance to their desire for US protection has been in large part due to the conviction that Chinese power is next door, while US power, no matter how great, is relatively remote and even undependable. Russian power, though a factor, is almost never considered as a real threat to the area; in fact, it is occasionally treated as a factor to be balanced against that of Communist China.

Many in Southeast Asia appear to believe that the Chinese colossus in the north is now embarked on a tremendous build-up of economic and military power which will sooner or later be used to engulf Southeast Asia. More and more opinion appears to regard Communist China as the "wave of the future," not necessarily ideologically but in terms of tangible power. It is against this raw image that US power is being measured. Despite a desire to regard American power in defense of Southeast Asian independence as a firm and decisive force, hesitation and doubt are clearly evident. An editorial in the Times of Viet Nam of March 5, 1960, quoted earlier, observed:

To the allies of the United States, especially the smaller ones, the application of this doctrine /massive retaliation/ means that their association with America increases the risk of their being destroyed. The type of war which will take place in the small countries will be the limited war. And precisely according to the 'massive retaliation' doctrine, the United States should not let itself be involved in this type of war. America's full power will be used only to defend America.

The implication presented in this editorial, and present in other opinion from the area, is that US power is currently designed to meet global military situations, not the limited, jungle-type warfare most likely to materialize in Southeast Asia. It is reported too that high Indonesian officials, including a close adviser of President Sukarno, expressed doubt that American assistance would be sufficiently timely or effective to defend Indonesia from a Chinese Communist attack. This direct question is not frequently discussed openly in the area, but one aspect of it was explored directly by the military President of our SEATO ally, Pakistan, in an interview with the New York Times on June 25, 1960.

General Ayub Khan, according to the Times, noted that Pakistanis were "beginning to doubt" that the US Government could react quickly enough to repel an enemy attack. The President of Pakistan said he did not doubt that the United States possessed the power to repel any attack, i.e., the

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image of US power was a strong one, but he commented that the governmental machinery to apply this power was "cumbersome, sluggish and a clumsy juggernaut." Ayub's comment bears on the central question raised in Southeast Asia, namely, the application of US power in a timely and effective manner to meet Southeast Asian needs.

It is ironic, but nonetheless central to the issue at question, that the nations of Southeast Asia, though often deploring the use of US power in such places as the Taiwan Straits in the fall of 1958 and in Lebanon and the Middle East earlier that summer, nevertheless were impressed by the effective disposition of American power in these situations which they could identify with those which could be operative in Southeast Asia. These demonstrations of our military effectiveness and national purpose, especially in the successful defense against the Chinese Communist operations directed at the off-shore islands, worked to our advantage and enhanced Southeast Asian confidence in our national power. The doubts and hesitations considered here, however, have not been dissipated, and they remain as a significant shadow on the image of American power.

Japan

In the past several years, the Japanese have unmistakably revised downward their estimation of US power relative to that of the Soviet Union but there is no clear evidence that the Japanese consider either nation as having a significant power advantage over the other.

Soviet space and rocketry achievements, economic progress and expanded aid to underdeveloped areas, together with rapidly advancing Japanese technological and scientific capabilities, have ended the post-war era of almost mystical awe of US achievements and inevitably produced a relative downgrading in the Japanese estimate of US pre-eminence and power. Likewise, the recent instability of Japanese popular sentiment toward relations with the US in part reflects lessened confidence in the ability of the US to withstand and counter Soviet pressures exerted around the Free World defense perimeter. This was obviously one of the factors some Japanese had in the back of their mind when speaking of the "changed atmosphere" in Japan after the U-2 affair and the Summit debacle. Yet, even earlier, the Japanese press was wont to speak of "the precarious military balance between East and West." And the Japanese have evidently begun to doubt the capability of American power to provide adequate protection to Japan in the event of conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Such was the psychological context in which during May and June so many Japanese apparently came to accept the claim of Bloc propaganda that the new US-Japan Security Treaty would increase the danger of war to Japan, even though they generally rejected the corollary claim that the treaty was aggressive in nature.

At the same time, it should be noted that the diminution in confidence in US power over the past several years has resulted in part from a faulty assessment by many Japanese of some of the realities of world power relationships, as well as from their tendency to project onto the international level their doubts about the ability of domestic democratic forces to meet the challenge from leftist forces and to withstand the encroachment of re-emerging authoritarian elements.

These are some of the trends that have worked to reduce the reservoir of confidence in and respect for US power that had been built up through popular experience with, and information about US technological, military

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and economic capabilities since 1944. However, as to the net effect of these trends, the fact remains that neither the findings of public opinion surveys since Sputnik I nor the output of Japanese "opinion leaders" have produced a clear-cut statement as to which power the Japanese in general feel is the stronger.

Unlike opinion in Southeast Asia, the Japanese do not yet regard Chinese Communist power as a threat to their security. They have, however, begun to regard with greater seriousness the growth of Chinese economic power as a potential competitor in Southeast Asia.

LATIN AMERICAThe Evidence

It should be borne in mind that the materials available for assessment of the Latin American view of the balance of power between the US and the USSR are fragmentary and uneven in reliability. These sources are field reporting, newspapers and periodicals, books, pamphlets, radio commentaries, returning US government officials, direct contacts while traveling in the area, and a few public opinion surveys. Therefore, any inferences drawn must for the most part be broad rather than detailed, suggestive rather than definitive. Moreover, attitudes on many issues related to the formation of the Latin American power images of the US and the USSR are still unformulated and unstable. For example, the relative strength attributed by Latin American opinion to an open society versus a controlled society for military purposes cannot be accurately measured from material available, nor can the Latin American opinion of such intangibles as moral strength, sense of purpose, or the "best man" in the "may-the-best-man-win" contest.

The Psychological Setting

Before discussing Latin American attitudes toward the US-USSR balance of power, the point should be made that Latin Americans generally regard themselves as not immediately involved in the Cold War. A lack of appreciation of the true nature of international communism and of the threat that it represents makes it difficult to convince Latin Americans of the necessity for coordinated anti-Communist measures. Moreover, it must be observed that domestic problems take priority over everything else in Latin American preoccupations, and that international issues, including that of international communism, are more likely to attract substantial public attention only when plainly seen as closely related to domestic considerations. Thus, Latin America tends toward isolationism from rather than direct involvement in the Cold War, despite its moral and political commitment to the West and the recognition on the part of informed Latin Americans of their dependence on the US for the defense of the hemisphere.

The Current Power Image of the US and the USSR

The Latin American power image of both the US and the USSR had improved during the Second World War, but there was no question that in the minds of Latin Americans the US held first place, especially subsequent to the development of the atomic bomb.

With the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb new images began to develop which tended to polarize power between the US and the USSR. The

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superiority achieved by the US was maintained, but the "balance of terror" concept began to creep in, tending to cut into the US overall superiority. Polarized atomic power, in turn, promoted or deepened the feeling that weak countries might better disengage themselves from entanglements in which they could play no significant role. The true extent of "third positionism" in Latin America was (and is) a matter of conjecture, but the scant military support offered against communism during the Korean War demonstrated its influence.

Nevertheless, there was a feeling of Latin American security within "fortress America," lead by the still considerably superior power of the US. Then came the first Sputnik and its apparent implications for missile warfare capabilities. The effect of Soviet missile developments on Latin American opinion has not been to downgrade the US power image as much as to raise the Soviet. The new trend is rather a reversal of the post-World War II, pre-Sputnik, trend: both power images have improved in relation to themselves, but the Soviet image has improved much more.

The drama in this change for the better in certain aspects of the Latin American image of the Soviet Union stemmed from the fact that up to the time of Sputnik esteem for US accomplishments in the scientific and military fields had been so high among Latin Americans that they considered it virtually beyond belief that any power could challenge US supremacy in these areas. Opinion surveys conducted in several Latin American cities subsequent to Sputnik (November 1957 and May 1958) showed that many felt that the Soviet lead in space development would be only temporary. Moreover, these surveys revealed that leadership in space science was not necessarily equated with leadership in science generally, and that many respondents still had sufficient confidence in the power potential of the US to estimate that the US rather than the USSR would emerge stronger at the end of a twenty-five year period of peaceful competition.

Although survey data and other standards of measure are very scanty and difficult to appraise, it seems that the image of the Soviet Union as a power capable of outstanding achievements in the field of military science and technology is gaining hold. The USSR's ability to compete successfully with the US may thereby be becoming more believable. The results of a survey conducted in Buenos Aires in February 1960 might be regarded as a minor indicator of this trend. More respondents felt that the USSR had more military power than the US, and when asked which country would emerge stronger after twenty years of peaceful competition, more felt that the USSR rather than the US would emerge as the stronger power.

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C. SELECTED SURVEY FINDINGS SECRET

1. A. U.S. Versus Soviet Faith and Dedication

a. 1. The Current West European View

"Now a brief comparison on more personal qualities between the Soviet people and those of the U.S.: Who do you think has greater faith in their basic principles -- the Soviet people or the people of the U.S.?"

"And who do you believe is willing to work harder to have their country lead the other in national achievement?"

<u>Greater Faith:</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)
Soviet people	39%	51%	44%	35%
People of U.S.	28	18	14	28
Both same	15	12	19	18
No opinion	18	19	23	19
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-11	-33	-30	-7

Willing to work harder:

Soviet people	62%	65%	67%	52%
People of U.S.	14	10	5	11
Both same	11	8	11	17
No opinion	13	17	17	20
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-48	-55	-62	-41

2. B. U.S. Versus Soviet Military Standing

a. 1. The Current World View

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Survey</u>	<u>Date of Survey</u>	<u>Net Favorable to U.S.</u>
Viet-Nam	(College Students)	March, 1959	32
Greece	(General Population)	November, 1958	20
Okinawa	(General Population)	December, 1958	14
Italy	(General Population)	February, 1960	6
Uruguay	(General Population)	June, 1958	4
West Germany	(General Population)	May-June, 1960	3
Japan	(General Population)	December, 1958	-1
Turkey	(College Students)	June, 1958	-2
France	(General Population)	May, 1960	-15
Buenos Aires, Argentina	(General Population)	February, 1960	-21
Norway	(General Population)	June, 1960	-30
Great Britain	(General Population)	May, 1960	-43

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6.2. The West European Trend

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

No. of cases	<u>Great Britain</u>				<u>West Germany</u>				<u>Norway</u>	
	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	May '60	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	May- June '60	Nov. '57	June '60
	(800)	(611)	(613)	(1150)	(813)	(1739)	(599)	(1010)	(845)	(1020)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	4%	7%	}15%	}12%	16%	9%	}22%	}26%	}35%	}15%
U.S. a little ahead	15	19			22	15				
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	31	22	}59	}55	17	16	}47	}23	}31	}45
Russia considerably ahead	19	19			6	7				
Both equal (Vol.)	6	8	4	5	20	22	8	16	11	17
No opinion	<u>25</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>23</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-31	-15	-44	-43	15	1	-25	3	4	-30

No. of cases	<u>France</u>				<u>Italy</u>				
	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Feb. '60	May '60	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
	(802)	(624)	(608)	(1000)	(807)	(635)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	6%	3%	}16%	}25%	17%	13%	16%	18%	}38%
U.S. a little ahead	11	16			17	25	17	18	
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	13	21	}37%	}60%	13	14	11	10	}32
Russia considerably ahead	12	8			9	9	7	8	
Both equal (Vol.)	20	34	16	-	23	22	24	26	5
No opinion	<u>33</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>29</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-8	-10	-21	-15	12	15	15	18	6

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3. C. U.S. Versus Soviet Scientific Standinga. X. The Current World View

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in scientific development at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Survey</u>	<u>Date of Survey</u>	<u>Net Favorable to U.S.</u>
Philippines	(General Population)	March, 1959	48
Turkey	(College Students)	June, 1958	29
Greece	(General Population)	November, 1958	23
West Germany	(General Population)	February, 1960	18
Uruguay	(General Population)	June, 1958	12
Philippines	(College Students)	August, 1958	12
Italy	(General Population)	February, 1960	7
Viet-Nam	(College Students)	March, 1959	0
Mexico	(General Population Mexico City)	March, 1958	-13
Norway	(General Population)	November, 1957	-12
India	(General literate Population)	August, 1958	-16
Japan	(General Population)	December, 1958	-17
Buenos Aires, Argentina	(General Population)	February, 1960	-25
Okinawa	(General Population)	December, 1958	-26
Great Britain	(General Population)	April, 1960	-29
France	(General Population)	February, 1960	-40
Nigeria	(University Students)	February, 1959	-46

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6.2. The West European Trend

"All things considered, do you think the U.S. or Russia is ahead in scientific development at the present time? Considerably ahead or only a little?"

No. of cases	Great Britain				West Germany			Norway
	Nov. '57 (800)	Oct. '58 (587)	Feb. '60 ² (608)	Apr. '60 (1032)	Nov. '57 (813)	Octo. '58 (1195)	Feb. '60 ² (623)	Nov. '57 (845)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	7%	17%	}25%	}23%	14%	15%	}45%	12%
U.S. a little ahead	13	26			22	29		19
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	39	23	}58	}52	27	19	}27	34
Russia considerably ahead	19	7			5	4		9
Both equal (Vol.)	6	12	4	6	15	19	9	14
No opinion	<u>16</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>17</u> 100%	<u>14</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>12</u> 100%
Net U.S. ahead	-38	13	-33	-29	4	21	18	-12

No. of cases	France			Italy					
	Nov. '57 (802)	Oct. '58 (596)	Feb. '60 (620)	Nov. '57 (807)	Oct. '58 (637)	Apr. '59 (1076)	Nov. '59 (691)	Dec. '59 (650)	Feb. '60 (579)
U.S. considerably ahead of Russia	4%	5%	}18%	12%	15%	10%	11%	11%	}40%
U.S. a little ahead	7	15		11	18	16	9	9	
Russia a little ahead of U.S.	29	21	}58	24	16	15	27	26	}33
Russia considerably ahead	20	13		13	14	13	18	16	
Both equal (Vol.)	16	33	9	21	21	26	17	21	4
No opinion	<u>24</u> 100%	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>19</u> 100%	<u>16</u> 100%	<u>20</u> 100%	<u>18</u> 100%	<u>17</u> 100%	<u>23</u> 100%
Net U.S. ahead	-38	-14	-40	-14	3	-2	-25	-22	7

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4 B. U.S. Versus Soviet Standing in Space Developmentc. The Current World View

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in space developments at the present time -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"

<u>Country and Date</u>	<u>Number of cases</u>	<u>U.S. Ahead</u>	<u>U.S.S.R. Ahead</u>	<u>Neither Ahead</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Net Favorable</u>
West Germany (May-June '60)	(1010)	11%	53%	12%	24%	-42
Great Britain (July '60)	(947)	10	58	4	28	-48
India - 4 Major Cities (August '58)	(724)	7	58	9	26	-51
Turkish Students (June '58)	(230)	7	67	20	6	-60
Norway (June '60)	(1020)	7	71	12	10	-64
Italy (February '60)	(1170)	11	75	3	11	-64
France (May '60)	(1000)	7	74	-	19	-67

6 -2. The West European Trend

"All things considered, which country do you think is ahead in space developments at the present time -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.?"

No. of cases	Great Britain				France		
	Feb.	Apr.	May	July	Feb.	May	
	'60	'60	'60	'60	'60	'60	
	(1221)	(1000)	(1130)	(947)	(1228)	(1000)	
U.S. ahead	5%	11%	7%	10%	2%	7%	
U.S.S.R. ahead	84	64	81	58	85	74	
Neither ahead (Vol.)	2	5	4	4	3	-	
No opinion	9	20	8	28	10	19	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Net U.S. ahead	-79	-53	-74	-48	=	-83	-67

	<u>West Germany</u>		<u>Italy</u>	<u>Norway</u>
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>May-June '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>June '60</u>
No. of cases	(1222)	(1010)	(1170)	(1020)
U.S. ahead	7%	11%	11%	7%
U.S.S.R. ahead	77	53	75	71
Neither ahead (Vol.)	3	12	3	12
No opinion	13	24	11	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. ahead	-70	-42	-64	-64

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C-3. The Current West European Desire

"Going back to space developments for a moment, what would be best, in your opinion -- for the U.S. to be ahead in space developments, the U.S.S.R. to be ahead, or neither to be ahead? How important do you think this is -- very important or not so important?"

No. of cases	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
	Feb. '60 (608)	Feb. '60 (623)	Feb. '60 (620)	Feb. '60 (579)
Prefer U.S. ahead - very important	33%) 43	27%) 38	20%) 25	28%) 36
Prefer U.S. ahead - not so important	10)	11)	5)	8)
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - very important	1) 3	*) *	4) 6	10) 13
Prefer U.S.S.R. ahead - not so important	2)	-)	2)	3)
Prefer neither ahead - very important	32) 44	32) 47	31) 56	25) 31
Prefer neither ahead - not so important	12)	15)	25)	6)
No opinion	<u>10</u> 100%	<u>15</u> 100%	<u>13</u> 100%	<u>20</u> 100%

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5. ~~P~~ U.S. Versus Soviet (Economic) Strength 25 Years Hencea. ~~X~~ The Current World View

"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"

<u>Country and Date</u>	<u>Number of cases</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Both Equal</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Net Net Total Favorable</u>
Philippines Students (Aug. '58)	(887)	50%	9%	24%	17%	41
Philippines (March '59)	(1609)	42	2	8	48	40
Netherlands (April '56)	(825)	44	13	16	27	31
Uruguay (April '59)	(1612)	36	15	8	41	21
Rio de Janeiro (May '58)	(200)	39	19	8	34	20
Vietnamese Students (Feb. & Mar. '59)	(462)	27	7	22	44	20
Greece (Nov. '58)	(1207)	30	12	8	50	18
Norway (Nov. '57)	(845)	38	23	18	21	15
Japan (Dec. '58)	(676)	23	17	6	54	6
Mexico City (May '58)	(200)	45	40	3	12	5
Okinawa (Dec. '58)	(577)	25	21	5	49	4
West Germany (Feb. '60)	(599)	29	29	19	23	0
Italy (Feb. '60)	(591)	22	24	32	22	-2
Buenos Aires (Feb. '60)	(560)	19	32	23	26	-13
India (Mid May-Aug. '58)	(724)	17	35	17	31	-18
Great Britain (Feb. '60)	(613)	25	44	10	21	-19
Turkish Students (June '58)	(230)	18	43	30	9	-25
France (Feb. '60)	(608)	7	35	25	33	-28
Arab Students (Dec. 1, '57 & Jan. 7, '58)	(274)	8	46	16	30	-38

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6 2. The West European Trend

"If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. settle down to competition without war for the next twenty or twenty-five years, which of the two do you think will end up as the stronger?"

No. of cases	Great Britain					West Germany						Norway
	Apr. '56	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Apr. '56	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60	Nov. '57
	(806)	(800)	(1198)		(613)	(863)	(813)	(1195)	(1258)		(599)	(845)
U.S.	35%	37%	36%		25%	37%	31%	38%	36%		29%	38%
U.S.S.R.	25	34	34	NA	44	22	21	21	20	NA	29	23
Both equally strong (Vol.)	15	11	11		10	14	24	25	19		19	18
No opinion	25	18	19		21	27	24	16	25		23	21
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%
Net U.S. stronger	10	3	2		-19	15	10	17	16		0	15

No. of cases	France				Italy					
	(800)	(802)	(1220)	(608)	(911)	(807)	(1272)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S.	10%	9%	14%		25%	28%	29%	27%	31%	22%
U.S.S.R.	21	20	24	NA	14	14	25	19	16	24
Both equally strong (Vol.)	14	22	30		26	34	27	23	28	32
No opinion	55	49	32		35	24	19	31	25	22
	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net U.S. stronger	-11	-11	-10		11	14	4	8	15	-2

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D. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT IRI REPORTS PERTAINING TO US-USSR STANDING

- R-2-60: The Impact of President Eisenhower's 11-Nation Tour on World Opinion: An Assessment
- R-22-60: U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology in Foreign Public Opinion
- R-25-60: Western European Public Reaction to Current Disarmament and Test Ban Talks
- R-27-60: The Free World's Image of the Soviet Union: A Tentative Appraisal
- R-47-60: Latin American Opinion on U.S. Economic Policies and Private Investment

- RM-19-60: Public Opinion Abroad and U.S. and Soviet Science and Technology
- RM-20-60: Pioneer V and Tiros I: A Summary of Free World Reaction
- RM-22-60: Reaction to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Talks
- RM-25-60: Free World Reactions to Selected International Issues
- RM-28-60: Free World Reactions to President Eisenhower's Far Eastern Trip

- FE-23-60: The Comparative Image of the U.S. Versus the Communist Powers Among Philippine University Students
- NE-6-60: Free World Versus Communist Bloc Standing in the Four Major Cities of India
- WE-61-60: The Impact of the Current Cold-War Detente Upon Trends in U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standings
- WE-62-60: West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris Summit Conference. I. General Standing of the U.S. Versus the U.S.S.R. in an Atmosphere of Detente
- WE-63-60: West European Climate of Opinion on the Eve of the Paris Summit Conference. II. U.S. or U.S.S.R. The Wave of the Future?
- WE-64-60: Post-Summit Trends in British and French Opinion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- WE-65-60: Post-Summit Trends in West German Opinion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- WE-66-60: Post-Summit Trends in Norwegian Opinion of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- WE-67-60: British Views on U.S. vs U.S.S.R. Standing on Specific Aspects of Space Achievement

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